公司治理、盈餘管理、高階經理人薪酬與未來績效之關係

本研究以臺灣2006年至2016年間上市櫃公司為研究樣本，首先對高階經理人薪酬概況進行分析，接著探討若企業在公司治理較佳之情況下，即企業能有效發揮董事會及股東會的監督機制時，高階經理人薪酬是否會較高；其次探討若盈餘管理幅度增強，高階經理人薪酬是否會愈高，本研究以裁決性應計項目、處分資產損益與處分投資損益作為盈餘管理之代理變數；最後探討公司治理、盈餘管理、高階經理人薪酬與公司未來績效(ROA、ROE、Tobin’s Q與股價報酬)之關係。本研究發現近10年上市公司之高階經理人年平均薪酬約為420萬，且是上櫃公司的1.5倍左右，而集團及高科技業之高階經理人薪酬也是非集團與非高科技業的1.5倍左右。在2008至2009金融海嘯期間，高階經理人薪酬有大幅下降之趨勢，且一直未回復至2007年之水準。本研究發現高階經理人薪酬與ROA、ROE及Tobin’s Q皆呈正向顯著之關係，表示高階經理人薪酬愈高，公司之會計績效與成長機會愈大；在公司治理變數部分，法人持股比率與ROA、ROE及Tobin’s Q皆呈顯著正向之關係外，席次盈餘偏離差愈大、轉投資家數愈多，皆會降低公司會計績效；在盈餘管理部分，處分資產損益與處分投資損益與ROA、ROE及Tobin’s Q皆呈顯著負向之關係。薪酬愈高驅使高階經理人利益與股東更加一致，因此在實證上顯著地提升了公司之績效，當管理當局基於自利因素運用盈餘管理進行操弄，透過處分資產或投資損益等方式會造成公司未來績效較差。

關鍵字

公司治理；盈餘管理；高階經理人薪酬；未來績效

並列摘要

This study firstly analysis the structure of CEO compensation in recent years. Secondly, the better corporate governance means companies can effectively play the supervision mechanism of the board of directors. We discuss whether better corporate governance delivers a higher CEO compensation. Thirdly, we explore if increase earnings management lead to a higher salary of CEO. Discretionary accruals and excess gain or loss on disposal of assets and of investments are used as the proxy for the magnitude of earnings management. Finally, we analyze the relationships among the corporate governance, earnings management, CEO compensation and future performance (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, stock return). This study collected the research samples of listed and OTC companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2006 until 2016. This study shows the listed companies year average compensation of CEO are NT 4.2 million, and it's one and a half times as high as that of OTC companies. The CEO compensation in the group companies and high-tech industries are also about 1.5 times that of non-groups and non-tech companies. During the financial crises from 2008 to 2009, the CEO compensation has fallen sharply and has not returned to the 2007 level. The empirical results show CEO compensation has a positively significant effect on the ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q. This implies that higher CEO compensation results in a higher accounting performance and corporate growth opportunities. In the corporate governance variables, institution shareholders have a positively significant effect on the ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q. Furthermore, deviations from one-share one vote and the number of reinvestment company have a negatively significant effect on the corporate accounting performance. In the earnings management variables, gain on disposal of investments and of assets has a negatively significant effect on the ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q. If the CEO compensation higher, it can make top managers executive interests to be more consistent with the shareholders, the results show that the company's performance has improved. When managers use earnings management for self-interest, the future performance of the company will be poor.