董事會控制力、高階管理者薪酬與公司績效之探討

Board control, Managerial pay, and Firm performance

蕭雨萱(Yu-Hsuan Hsiao)

指導教授 ： 陳明園

國立中央大學/管理學院/人力資源管理研究所/碩士(2012年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討董事會控制力、高階管理者薪酬與公司績效相互影響關係。藉由5個董事會控制力 (1)CEO雙重性；(2)內部董事席次比(管理階層兼任董事會成員數/董事會人數)；(3)董事持股比 (董事會持股佔流通在外股數之比率，但不包含高階管理者持股率)；(4)機構投資人持股比；(5)董事薪酬，瞭解董事會控制力、高階管理者薪酬與公司績效之相互影響程度之關係， 作為未來企業如何建構高階管理者薪酬以達董事會、高階管理者、企業三者利益最大化之參考依據。本研究以2009年至2010年台灣上市公司資料為研究對象，並利用線性結構關係模式(Linear Structure Relation, LISREL)做為資料分析方法。該研究結果期望可為高階管理者薪酬決定因素提供一不同的觀點及視野外，並提供決策參考依據。
本研究結果顯示，對所有上市企業而言，董事會控制力可直接有效地影響高階管理者薪酬，且亦可透過高階管理者薪酬直接有效地影響公司績效，但卻無法透過董事會控制力對公司績效之直接影響對其高階管理者薪酬產生間接之影響效果；而在大規模企業方面，董事會控制力對高階管理者薪酬具有直接之影響力，進而有效地影響公司績效，其影響強度勝於董事會控制力透過對公司績效之直接影響後對高階管理者薪酬產生之間接影響力；在小規模企業而言，雖董事會控制力無法直接有效地影響高階管理者薪酬，但卻可透過董事會控制力對公司績效之直接影響對其高階管理者薪酬產生間接之影響效果。因此，本研究認為，一昧地單靠董事會控制力來抑制高階管理者之薪酬，並非為直接有效的辦法，且本研究研究結果證實高階管理者薪酬誘因機制於公司治理機制中扮演重要之關鍵角色，因此企業須設計一套合適高階管理者薪酬激勵制度，使其為公司效力之餘，仍獲得應得之報酬，配合董事會之監督，使高階管理者志於為公司創造價值，再依公司績效之優劣，以評估高階管理者相對合理之薪酬，此乃為合適之作法。

關鍵字

高階管理者薪酬 ； 公司績效 ； 公司治理 ； 董事會控制力

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to discuss the interaction between board control, managerial pay, and firm performance. By using five board control variables, including (1)CEO duality; (2)The ratio of inside directors; (3)The ratio of board stock ownership; (4)The institutional ownership; (5)The level of director compensation, we would like to understand the different extent of interaction between board control, managerial pay and firm performance. By doing so, we would like to provide information for firms about how to construct the managerial pay in order to maximize board, top managers, and firms’ benefit. The hypothesis in this study was tested by using a sample of 628 Taiwanese Listed Companies in 2009 to 2010. Linear Structure Relation (LISREL) was used as an analysis method in this research. We hope that the results in this study can provide a different view on the determinants of managerial pay, and can benefit firms’future related decision.
The results indicate that: In All 628 Taiwanese Listed Companies, the board control not only can directly influence managerial pay, but also indirectly influence firm performance through managerial pay. However, the positive relationship between board control and firm performance does not indirectly influence managerial pay. For large-scale companies, board control can have direct influence on managerial pay, and then it can directly influence firm performance. This influence of board control exercised directly on managerial pay is more effective than its indirect influence on managerial pay through the direct influence it has on firm performance. And for small-scale company, although the board control cannot directly and effectively effect managerial pay, it can have indirect influence on managerial pay through the direct influence it has on firm performance.
According to our results, we suggest that board control is not the only effective way to control managerial pay, and confirm that the managerial pay serve as a key role in corporate governance. Therefore, companies must design suitable compensation incentive systems for top managers, in order to motivate them to do their best for the company. And also, the board needs to carefully monitor managerial compensation, in order to push them to and make decisions really aligned with corporate interest. Furthermore, the board may need to assess the proper compensation level for top managers according to firm performance.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Board control ； Managerial pay ； Firm performance

參考文獻

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