從新制度的觀點來看立委選制改變對於區域選區內部的影響－以高雄市為例

第七屆立法委員選舉從「單記不可讓渡制」（SNTV）變成「單一選區兩票制」的混合選制，立委選制改變對政治最大的衝擊便是選區從複數選區變成單一選區。本文基於「選舉制度變遷-選區變動-政治利害關係人行動」架構，採取新制度主義下的理性選擇制度主義作為研究途徑，並以高雄市選區為探討對象，探討選區內政治利害關係人的互動情形。針對立委選舉制度改變後，當複數選區變成單一選區時，政黨與候選人在理性的考量之下，面對選舉制度及選區的變動，會如何調整選舉策略，以獲得最大的利益。研究發現政黨提名方向受到選制改變的影響，在提名上會避免爭議人選，而候選人為了獲取選票，皆有加強與地方連結的情形，以便獲得選民的認同。而由於單一選區傾向兩黨對決，比起複數選區，在單一選區下政黨的整體表現對於選情勢均力敵的選區影響力更大。另外在單一選區，選民結構則是主導政黨與候選人參選動機的重大要素。本文雖預期在單一選區，由於選區明確，即使落選，政黨也能夠更確切的經營選區，伺機反敗為勝，然而從訪談後可以發現，大多是由有意參選的候選人自行去經營，政黨提供的是協調與提名的平台，並不會積極去參與選區事務。未來政黨是否能夠更積極經營選區，提出良好候選人以達到良性的互動，可能仍需要時間去發展出一套穩定的機制。

關鍵字

選制改革；單一選區；新制度主義；理性選擇

並列摘要

The 2008 legislative election has gone through a change from “Single-Non-Transfer Vote System” (SNTV) to “mixed electoral systems” which combine the features of both single-member districts(SMD) and proportional representation(PR).And one of the impacts is the multi-member electoral districts had been changed to the single-member electoral districts. This study aims to explore the reaction of the political actor by applying the rational-choice institutionalism approach and “electoral system-the legislative district-the political actor” framework to analyze the interaction between political parties and the candidates in Kaohsiung City. The core theoretical claim in rational-choice institutionalism is that the formal electoral rules generate important and shape the behavior of political actor. Political actors(political parties and the candidates) are rational self-interest in pursuit of electoral office who respond strategically to electoral incentive by the electoral districts size. The result shows that the political parties will avoid nominating the candidate whose image is controversial. The candidates will enhance the linkage between the citizen and the candidates to earn citizens’ support. The single-member districts would have stronger linkage between citizens and legislator than the multi-member districts. When the candidates are well-matched, the political party’s performance is more important in single-member districts than multi-member districts, because single-member districts usually lead to two parties system. In single-member electoral districts, the ballot structure became an essential factor to shape political parties and candidates’ incentive. Although this study anticipated that it’s easy for the parties to manage the constituent service positively to win the election. But after interview, the author find out that the constituent service mostly provided by the candidates who want to participate in the election. Parties still act negatively coordinated and candidate selection platform. It still takes time to develop a set of good stable mechanisms on choosing good candidates to achieve the good political interaction.