公司治理與資本結構之關聯性：台灣中小企業之實證

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure: Evidence from Taiwan SMEs

劉惠文(Hui-Wen Liu)

指導教授 ： 郭憲章

國立暨南國際大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討台灣中小企業之公司治理與資本結構的關聯性，並在模型中納入產業及公司規模異質性影響，選取2000年至2007年的145家上市、櫃公司為研究對象進行分析。實證結果發現，就全體樣本而言，中小企業之盈餘-股份偏離程度愈低時，最終控制股東會增加總負債以及長、短期負債金額；大股東偏好低負債融資並未出現掠奪少數股東利益的行為；金融機構持股具監督及負債認證的功能，可降低短期負債比率；經理人持股比率愈高可能藉由增加總、長期以及短期負債來獲取代理利益；家族股東可能藉由增加總負債融資來獲取代理利益；經理人董事、獨立董事以及家族董事席次皆具有降低權益代理問題的作用，能降低總負債及短期負債以減少公司破產風險。就產業而言，科技產業之盈餘股份偏離比對總負債比率的影響程度高於傳統產業，相較於傳統產業，科技產業之最終控制股東會傾向增加更多的負債比率；傳統產業之大股東偏好低負債融資並未出現掠奪少數股東利益的行為，而科技產業之大股東偏好高負債融資；科技產業之家族董事席次對總負債比率的影響程度低於傳統產業，顯示家族董事會減輕權益代理問題，相較於科技產業，傳統產業之家族董事愈多更會傾向減少使用負債融資，避免負債增加公司破產風險。就公司規模而言，小規模公司之大股東偏好負債融資，而大規模公司之大股東偏好低負債融資；大規模公司之金融機構持股比率對長期負債比率的影響程度低於小規模公司，顯示小規模公司之金融機構股東較大規模公司偏好長期負債融資。

關鍵字

中小企業 ； 公司治理 ； 資本結構 ； 股權結構 ； 董事會結構

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of Taiwan. We include industry dummy variable and size dummy variable in model. This study selects a panel data from 145 TSEC and OTC listed companies over the period from 2000 to 2007. On the whole, we find evidence that deviation of cash flow rights and control rights is low, controlling shareholders prefer high debt. There exsits no entrenchment effect with blockholders, so they prefer low leverage. Financial institutional stockholders tend to monitor managers more actively, causing these mangers to adopt lower short-term debt ratio. Managers and family shareholders employ more debt financing to acquire agency-related benefits. SMEs with more manager directors, independent directors, and family directors can reduce agency problem, so they tend to pursue low total debt ratio and low short-term debt ratio to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. In term of industry effect, the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights impact on total debt ratio of high-tech industries is higher than traditional industries. The controlling shareholders of high-tech industries prefer more debt than traditional industries. The blockholders of traditional industries prefer lower debt ratio, but the blockholders of high-tech industries prefer higher debt ratio. The family directors impact on total debt ratio of high-tech industries is lower than traditional industries. The family directors of both industries can reduce agency problem, but the family directors of traditional industries prefer less debt than high-tech industries to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. In term of firm size effect, the blockholders of small firms prefer higher debt ratio, but the blockholders of large firms prefer lower debt ratio. The financial institutional stockholders impact on long-term debt ratio of large firms is lower than small firms. The financial institutional stockholders of small firms prefer more long-term debt than large firm.

並列關鍵字

small and medium enterprises (SMEs) ； corporate governance ； capital structure ； ownership structure ； board of director structure

參考文獻

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