可轉換公司債-以台灣案例分析

在2016年以前，可轉換公司債似乎非常安全，沒有破產倒債的疑慮；2016年以後，可轉換公司債的債信方面，有許多案例都顯得頗有疑慮。本研究依上述對於可轉債的描述為研究背景，進一步分析各2016與2017年公司發行可轉債時的公司結構，並與相關時事案例整合，做完整的研析。以台灣可轉換公司債的發展，進行可轉債在台發行的時間追朔，並輔以相關政策作為說明。接著以過度自信理論及可轉債相關文獻作為理論基礎。最終，經由個案分析和前述文獻的分析，加上資料實證結果。首先，本研究發現，ROA和公司有無發行可轉債大致呈現負相關，而對發行可轉債的公司而言，2017年的資產報酬率顯著高於2016年；每股綜合損益亦與公司有無發行可轉債呈現負相關，2017年的綜合損益高於2016年。其次，由CB看公司派動向的策略，可觀察有無融券突然暴增。券商將CB拆成固定收益（公司債）與選擇權兩部分，分別出售給不同需求的投資者；亦即將債券部分售予債券投資者，而選擇權部分則另售予選擇權投資者。其三，可轉換公司債實務案例部份與「代理理論 Agency Theory｣相關，代理人(經理人)擁有的信息比委托人(投資者)多，委托人和代理人的利益不對等相稱時，代理人將會利用各種可能的機會，增加自己的財富。專業能力不對稱、資訊來源不對稱、資金多寡不對稱、避險管道不對稱等，將使可轉換公司債投資人增加額外投資風險。最後，本研究針對投資人提出投資上之建議: 1. 政府對於控管可轉債之效應也越來越擴大。可轉債發行家數也從原本的261家下降至204家(21.8%)，下降了兩成有餘。2017年以後，對於可轉債之控管越來越嚴格，造成台灣可轉債之發行數，日益下降。建議政府在控管可轉債方面，可以再適度鬆綁以調整至對於企業與投資人最適切的管制程度，法律應是最基本的底限要求，以美國為例立法從寬執法從嚴，如果逾越了底限，那麼執法者將沒有任何模糊空間。才能訂出最有經濟效率的規範法則。 2. 等待切入得時機點，是小股民唯一戰勝大股東的機會，但這也要小股民在歷經慘劇之後仍能保有反撲之能力，否則就是機會來了你也是無機可乘，只能眼睜睜看著機會離開。

關鍵字

可轉換公司債；過度自信理論；杜邦分析；投資評價分析

並列摘要

Before 2016, convertible corporate bonds seemed to be very safe, and there was no doubt about bankruptcy and credit risk; after 2016, there were many cases in which the credit risk of convertible corporate bonds appeared to be quite uncertain. The purpose of this study is to analyze the company structure when the company issues convertible bonds during 2016 and 2017, and to investigate the relevant convertible bond cases to conduct a complete analysis. In particular, this study summazies the regulatory timeline of convertible bonds in Taiwan, and discuss the practices of issuing convertible bonds, supplemented by relevant policies. The theory of overconfidence and the literature on convertible bonds are utilzed for the case study. There are several findings. First, the study documents that Return on Assets (ROA) is negatively correlated with the issuance of convertible bonds, and the Return on Assets in 2017 is significantly higher than that in 2016 for companies issuing convertible bonds. In addition, the consolidated profit/loss per share is also negatively correlated with the issuance of convertible bonds, and the consolidated profit/ loss in 2017 was higher than that in 2016 for companies issuing convertible bonds. Secondly, CB sees to provide some information to the market, and investors can observe whether there is a sudden surge in the margin trading in addition to the CB information. The brokers split the CB into fixed income (corporate bonds) and options, and sell them separately to investors with different needs. That is, they sell the bonds to bond investors and choose sold the right separately to option investors. Third, according to the Agency Theory, the agent (manager) has more information than the principal (investor). When the interests of the principal are conflict with the interests of agent, the agent may be opportunistic. The asymmetry information between principals and agents regarding managerial ability, company prospects, funding sources of the company, and the different hedging ability will increase the risk of investing in convertible bonds. Finally, this study proposes the investment advices for investors as follows: 1. The effect of government regulations on the practice of convertible bonds has been extending. The number of convertible bond issuers dropped from the original 261 to 204 (21.8%), a decrease of more than 20%. After 2017, the regulations on convertible bonds have been stricter, resulting in a decline in the issuance of convertible bonds in Taiwan. To some extent the government can loosen the regulations on convertible bonds to adjust to the most appropriate level for enterprises and investors. 2. Waiting for the opportunity is the only way for retail investors to win.