自2002年安隆(Enron)案爆發後,與公司治理或資訊揭露有關的議題備受重視。2003年證券交易所及證券櫃檯買賣中心委託財團法人證券暨期貨市場發展基金會建置「資訊揭露評鑑系統」,此評鑑系統建立的目的即在提升公司資訊揭露的透明度,以促進資本市場的健全發展。過去研究發現資訊揭露評鑑系統實施後,管理當局的盈餘管理行為明顯降低,但卻無法辨識出評鑑結果「較透明」與「較不透明」的公司在盈餘管理程度上的差異。惟鑒於過去研究亦發現債券評等的變動可傳遞新的資訊內涵,本研究擬自評鑑結果的更動出發,探討公司資訊揭露評鑑結果的變動與盈餘管理間之關聯。實證結果顯示公司評鑑結果的更動與裁決性應計數呈負相關,特別是公司資訊揭露程度增加時,經理人傾向減少盈餘管理的行為。
After 2002, post-Enron period, issues related to corporate governance and information disclosure have been widely discussed. In order to improve the companies’ transparency and encourage companies disclose more information, the Securities and Futures Institute (“SFI”), entrusted by the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (“TSEC”) and the Gre Tai Securities Market (“GTSM”), currently launched “Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System”(IDTRS) to evaluate the level of transparency for all public trade companies in Taiwan since 2003. Prior studies suggest that the level of disclosure from IDTRS can’t differentiate earnings management between “more transparent” and “less transparent” companies. However, past studies indicate that a bond rating change can convey new information to the market. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine whether firms’ ranking changes from IDTRS are related to earnings management. As expected, we find that disclosure ranking changes are negative correlative with the proxy of earnings management - discretionary accruals. Especially for the firms with disclosure ranking upgradings tend to engage less in earnings management.