吹哨者及其保護制度對代理問題影響之分析性研究

An Analytical Study of The Relationship Between Whistleblower Protection Systems and Agency Problems

蔡玥宏(YUEH-HONG TSAI)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

本研究以賽局理論模式探討吹哨者保護制度對員工吹哨者及公司之影響。吹哨者可以視為存在於企業內部隱含之監督機制，使高階經理人無法任意進行不法行為。然而若吹哨者為企業內部員工，可能會遭到僱主之報復。因此，應建立有效的吹哨者保護制度，以避免員工不敢勇於吹哨。
研究結果顯示，在完善的吹哨者保護制度框架下，員工吹哨意願將會提高，但公司可從解雇員工吹哨者來獲取足夠效益，則其從事不法行為之動機仍存在。

關鍵字

代理理論 ； 吹哨者保護制度 ； 吹哨者

並列摘要

In this study, we use a game-theoretical model to investigate the effect of the system of whistleblower protection on the employees and the companies. Whistleblowing can be treated as an implicit supervisings mechanism to prevent senior managers’ possible illegal activities. However, if the whistleblower are internal employees, they may be subject to companys’ revenge. Therefore, an effective whistleblower protection system should be established to encourage employees to blow the whistle.
The results show that under a sound framework for whistleblower protection system, the employees’ willingness to blow the whistle can be improved, but the companies might still take illegal actions if they can receive large benefit from dismissing the whistleblowers.

並列關鍵字

Agency theory ； Whistleblower protection system ； Whistleblower

參考文獻

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