- 學位論文
承銷商與創投公司對初次發行公司進行盈餘操縱之影響
The Impact of Underwriters and Venture Capital on IPO Issuer’s Earnings Management
摘要
本研究主要探討在公司初次公開發行過程中，承銷商與創投公司在抑制初次公開發行公司進行盈餘操縱上是否扮演著顯著的角色。由於公司股票尚未於公開市場進行交易，且僅有少數資訊資源能幫助外部投資人檢視公司過去的績效，因此參與初次公開發行過程的承銷商與創投公司，是否能在公司初次公開發行過程中，分別扮演其應有的擔保(certification)、監督(monitoring)功能，應是一個重要的課題，除此之外，Lee and Masulis (2006)以美國初次公開發行公司為樣本發現，承銷商有抑制盈餘操縱之效果，其中以高聲譽承銷商最為顯著，而創投公司則無，因而本研究欲探究在台灣金融市場中是否有相同的情形，故分別驗證在初次公開發行當年度，對於初次公開發行公司而言，承銷商是否能發揮其擔保功能、創投公司是否具有監控功能或是為了自身利益反而存在道德風險(moral hazard)，以及設立期間短之創投公司是否會為炫耀(grandstanding)本身投資績效反而鼓勵初次公開發行公司進行盈餘操縱之行為。 本研究以於民國91年至95年底在台灣辦理普通股初次公開發行之公司為研究對象，共388家觀察值，研究方法採用平均數差檢定以及中位數差檢定(Wilcoxon Sign Ranks)兩種單變量統計分析方法與多元迴歸模型進行實證分析，另以Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983)所發展之計量統計方法Propensity Score Matching method(PSM)對前述研究方法之結果再次驗證。實證結果發現：較高聲譽之承銷商在初次公開發行過程中扮演著重要的擔保監控角色，支持了承銷商對初次公開發行公司擔保功能的存在；創投公司對初次公開發行公司監控功能並不存在，反而有道德風險的情形。除此之外，不論是創投公司的設立期間還是創投公司的資本額，均對盈餘操縱之影響呈現正向關係，因此，在初次公開發行年度，設立期間短且較低聲譽之創投公司對於為了炫耀其本身投資績效而放縱初次公開發行公司進行盈餘操縱的情形並不存在。
並列摘要
This research main investigates whether financial intermediaries that underwriters and venture capital participating in the initial public offerings process appear to play a significant role in restraining earnings management. Due to there is no market in the stock and only a few source of information are available to help investors evaluate prior firm performance, thus whether financial intermediaries that underwriters and venture capital participating in the initial public offerings process appear to play certification and monitoring function should a very important study. Moreover Lee and Masulis (2006) find underwriters have the effect in restraining earnings management in America IPO firm, which especially more reputable underwriters, but venture capital not. So this research identifying dividedly that about initial public offerings issuers whether underwriters have certification function, whether venture capital to have monitoring function or in order to obtain self-interest instead being moral hazard, and younger venture capital for grandstanding investment performances instead encourage earnings management by initial public offerings firms in initial public offerings year. This research with 2002 appears on market up total 388 companies at the end of 2006 to the Taiwanese first time for the search sample, is analyzed with two kind of univariate tests: a difference in means test and difference in median test (Wilcoxon sign ranks), multivariate regression models and in addition using propensity score matching method which was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to examine the undertake substantial evidence. Find as a result: more reputable underwriters play a significant certification and monitoring role, show supports underwriters certification function in initial public offerings firms existence. However venture capital monitoring function for initial public offerings firms is not obvious, instead venture capital be have moral hazard for initial public offerings firms. Moreover, research evidence that no matter venture capital age or capitalization all present to positive relation to effect of earnings management. Therefore empirical result of this research show that less age and less reputable venture capital for grandstand investment performances instead encourage earnings management by initial public offerings firms is not obvious.