高階經理人薪酬與公司財務績效關聯性之探討-以美國上市公司CEO為例

A Case Study of US Listed Company CEO from the Perspective of the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate Financial Performance

黃奕軒(YI-HSUAN HUANG)

指導教授 ： 黃啟瑞

國立臺北大學/商學院/金融與合作經營學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

世界主要國家之公司CEO薪酬契約，注重薪酬與公司財務績效(包含會計績效與股價績效)連結，CEO薪酬(含現金與股票的部分)必須隨著公司財務績效表現調整，根據理論為代理理論(Murphy, 1999)和管家理論(Davis, 1997)。2001年美國爆發安隆公司(Enron)的會計弊案，企業會計、證券監管出現重大疏失，重挫投資人和消費者對公司信譽的信心；而2008年美國發生金融海嘯，許多企業虧損面臨破產，甚至接受大規模美國政府資金紓困，但高階經理人仍坐擁高薪的肥貓現象層出不窮，美國政府分別在2002年、2010年推動沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)和華爾街改革與消費者保護法(Dodd-Frank)法案，針對高階經理人薪酬約束規範，改善肥貓現象。

本研究探討CEO薪酬(總薪酬、現金薪酬及權益薪酬)與公司財務績效之間的關聯性，並使用薪酬績效彈性(pay-performance elasticity)探討公司價值對CEO薪酬的影響，衡量CEO薪酬變動相對於公司價值的變動。此外，本研究也探討2002年沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)以及2010年Dodd-Frank法案推動後，對於CEO薪酬與公司價值的連結是否有影響。最後，陳珈君(2014)利用EM演算法將樣本資料分群，分為肥貓群與正常群，本研究探討這兩群的公司CEO薪酬與公司財務績效之間的關聯性比較。本研究樣本期間為2000~2014年，研究對象為美國上市公司完整年度資料，共548家美國企業，樣本數為8596。

實證結果為: (1)在美國高度法治的情況下，整體美國公司皆依照公司財務績效來發放CEO薪酬(總薪酬、現金薪酬與權益薪酬)且公司價值正向顯著影響CEO薪酬，說明了CEO利益與公司股東利益趨於一致。(2)總薪酬績效彈性(Total pay-performance elasticity)為0.364，明顯高於Conyon and Murphy (2000)實證出的美國高階經理人PPE為0.27，說明了PPE越大時，高階經理人與股東利益越趨向一致。(3)公司CEO年齡越大，領取越多的薪酬(總薪酬、現金薪酬與權益薪酬)。(4)女性CEO比男性CEO領取更多的現金薪酬，但男性CEO比女性CEO領取更多的權益薪酬。(5)給予CEO越多現金薪酬，會激勵CEO提高當期以及下期會計績效；給予CEO越多權益薪酬，會激勵CEO提高當期股價績效，但是卻會降低下期股價績效。(6)CEO年齡越大且為女性，越能提高公司會計績效，但是無法提高股價績效。(7)2002年沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)以及2010年Dodd-Frank法案推動後，會加強CEO薪酬與公司價值的連結。(8)分群後，肥貓群公司現金薪酬有顯著肥貓現象，權益薪酬沒有顯著肥貓現象。

關鍵字

高階經理人薪酬 ； 代理理論 ； 管家理論 ； 薪酬績效彈性

並列摘要

The CEO compensation contracts in the main countries of the world, focus on the link between compensation and company's financial performance (including accounting performance and stock price performance). CEO pay (including cash and stock portion) must be adjusted with the company's financial performance, according to the theory of agency theory (Murphy, 1999), and stewardship theory (Davis, 1997).In 2001, the outbreak of Enron accounting scandals, corporate accounting and securities regulators appeared negligence and it plunged investor and consumer confidence in the credibility of the company; In 2008, when the US financial tsunami occurred, many companies faced bankruptcy even accepted massive US government bailout funds, but executives still received high compensation and the fat cat phenomenons were widely known in US. Therefore, the US government pushed Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, and the Wall Street reform and consumer protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010. Parts of the laws imposed restrictions on the executive compensation and improved fat cat phenomenons.

This study investigated the association between CEO compensation(total compensation, cash compensation and equity compensation) and the company's financial performance, and this study uses pay-performance elasticity to discuss the effect of the firm value on CEO compensation and to measure the changes of CEO compensation relative to the changes of firm value. In addition, this study also explored after 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 2010 Dodd-Frank Act were approved, whether the loose link between the CEO compensation and firm value will improve and become tight. Finally, Chen Jia Jun (2014) use EM algorithm to divide into two groups with normal and fat cat population, this study investigates the relevance comparisons between the two groups of company CEO pay and corporate financial performance. During the study period of 2000 year to 2014 year, the study samples are the full year US listed company data. The panel data total 548 US companies and the number of samples is 8596.

The empirical results are: (1) US companies are in accordance with the company's overall financial performance to issue CEO compensation (total compensation, cash compensation and equity compensation) and explains that CEO interests and the interests of shareholders converge. (2) To give more CEO cash compensation, the incentives will encourage CEO to increase the current and the next accounting performance; However, to give more CEO equity compensation, CEO will increase the current share price performance, but reduce the next stock price performance. (3) After the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act were promoted, they will strengthen the link between the CEO compensation and firm value.

並列關鍵字

executive compensation ； agency theory ； stewardship theory ； pay-performance elasticity

參考文獻

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