我國股東提案權制度之現況與困境—以日本股東提案權制度為鑑

Current Situations and Difficulties of Shareholder’s Proposal Mechanism in Taiwan — A Comparative Study from Shareholder’s Proposal Mechanism in Japan

邱竑錡(HUNG-CHI CHIU)

指導教授 ： 杜怡靜

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系一般生組/碩士(2016年)

摘要

我國在2005年時修法增定股東提案權制度，其當初之立法目的係因鑒於現代公司法架構下，公司之經營權及決策權多賦予董事會，為使股東得積極參與公司之經營，爰賦予股東提案權。而在股東提案制度增訂前，實務上即存在行之有年之股東會臨時動議制度，惟臨時動議時常造成股東突襲且有與股東提案權制度重疊之處，故應限制其行使要件，避免股東提案權之作用，僅在於不得以臨時動議提出之事項中方得展現，並進一步促進股東會中股東完整資訊之取得，使臺灣公司治理得以更加完善。
另外股東提案權於2013年到2015年之上市上櫃公司中之行使狀況，與日本上市公司比較，有股東提起股東提案之公司比例上，我國係較日本多，惟提案總數則係日本遠高於我國，除了社會性議題之大量提出外，日本未限制提案件數應為理由之一。在提案內容日本有大量社會性議題之提案，惟我國卻付之闕如，提案內容多為股利發放或現金減資等，故對於股東提案可增進社會性議題之期望並未達成。
在經過與日本法上之比較以及參考我國學說之發展後，本文提出以下幾點之修正建議。一、強化股東提案權，建議在持有已發行股份總數百分之一之股份持有要件外，應再增設達一定數量之股份數亦得提出股東提案之要件，使公開發行公司之股東能較容易達成持股要件，股東能更容易參與公司經營。二、將建議性提案列入股東會議程。三、於大型公司賦予主管機關對股東提案之審查權。四、限縮臨時動議，並加強股東會召集通知之揭露。

關鍵字

臨時動議 ； 股東提案權 ； 公司治理 ； 股東民主

並列摘要

Under the Corporate Law, the power of management and decision making is mainly granted to the board of directors, in order to promote communication between shareholders and management, and increase shareholders’ focus on corporation management. It was based on this rationale that the shareholder proposal mechanism was adopted in Taiwan in 2005. Before the amendment, motion in the shareholders’ meeting had been existing for many years. The motion not only surprised shareholders often, but also highly overlapping the shareholder proposal mechanism. It is necessary to limit the terms of submitting the motion in the shareholders’ meeting, to prevent the function of shareholder proposal being limited, and will further enhance the transparency of company information.
Comparing the practices of public companies’ shareholder proposal in Taiwan and Japan, the proportion of proposal-submitting company in Taiwan is higher than Japan from 2013 to 2015; meanwhile, total amount of proposal submission in Japan is much more than Taiwan. In addition to a large number of proposals on social issues, the proposal submission amount in Japan is unlimited, this might also be one of the reasons for this condition.
After comparison with Japan, this thesis provide amendment suggestions as follow: First, enhancing practicability of shareholder proposal, in addition to the existing 1% of outstanding shares threshold, it should provide one more threshold—holding certain amount of outstanding shares—to let shareholders in large-scale corporate easier to reach the security threshold, easier to take part in corporate management; Second, listing advisory proposals in the agenda; Third, entitling authorities the power to examine shareholder proposals rejected by public companies; Finally, restricting the exercising of motion in the shareholders’ meeting and increasing the disclosure of convening notice.

並列關鍵字

Extemporary Motion ； Shareholder Proposals ； Corporate Governance ； Shareholder Democracy

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