股東會與公司治理

The Shareholders' Meeting and Corporate Governance

曾宛如(Wang-Ruu Tseng)

《臺大法學論叢》 39卷3期 (2010/09) Pp. 109-166

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2010.39.03.03

摘要

股東會權限之大小端視公司法制係採行董事會優位主義或股東會優位主義而有不同。然而，不論在何一政策下，股東會均應發揮在該政策下應有之功能。實證經驗上顯示股東會之召開、議程設定及程序進行容易受到董事會之操縱而減損其功能。然而面對此種情境，現行法下所能提供之救濟幾希。
美國德拉瓦州公司法藉由法律與衡平界線之釐清就股東會功能減損之實例給予救濟並提供判斷標準，惟於董事會優位主義下，仍堅持股東決議權與提案權係屬二事。
我國法下，董事會操縱股東會之情形並不稍遜。章程修改不僅是操縱的明證之一，且得到多數法院之支持。事後救濟制度緩不濟急但事前救濟制度，如假處分，其運用之分寸仍未成熟。即使引進股東提案權及董事候選人提名制度，由於對違反之董事，公司法所提供之制裁機制並無實益，故董事或許寧可違法也不願遵守。
凡此種種皆繫於股東會與董事會間權限劃分之釐清；就此方能確定股東會之功能，並針對相關制度提供完整設計及事後救濟。

關鍵字

董事會優位主義 ； 股東會優位主義 ； 股東提案權 ； 董事候選人提名制度 ； 董事交錯任期制 ； 權限劃分 ； 股東陳述 ； 商業判斷法則

並列摘要

The scope of the power of the shareholders' meeting depends on the adoption of director primacy or shareholder primacy. However, no matter which one prevails, the shareholders' meeting should have certain functions under the policy. Practical experience shows that convening a meeting, setting its agenda and conducting the meeting are all subjected to the manipulation of the board of directors. Accordingly, the function of the shareholders' meeting is diminished. When faced with this difficulty, there are not many remedies available under the current legislation.
Delaware's courts have endeavored to develop a set of standards to delineate the boundary between law and equity and have thus provided relief for the aggrieved shareholders. Nonetheless, by believing in director primacy, Delaware's courts insist on the passivity of shareholders' proposals.
For decades, the board of directors in Taiwan has been inclined to manipulate the procedure of the shareholders' meeting. The alteration of the articles of incorporation provides a good example of this scenario. Unfortunately, such manipulation has been well supported by the courts due to the misunderstanding of the true meaning of ”setting the agenda”.
The ex post remedies are often too late to repair any damage. Therefore, rules related to shareholder proposals and shareholder director nominations have been introduced into the Company Act to mitigate this situation. However, the law does not give shareholders teeth with which to bite when the rules are breached.
All these issues are related to the way in which power is allocated between the board of directors and the shareholders' meeting. Only after this has been done, can the functions of the shareholders' meeting be ascertained and the rules restructured to put things in order.

並列關鍵字

director primacy ； shareholder primacy ； shareholder proposal ； shareholder director nominations ； staggered board ； allocation of power between shareholders and directors ； members' statements ； business judgment rule

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