公司治理之目標乃為追求公司營運的健全及公司的最大利益,我國傳統即採雙軌制之監察人作為我國內部監控機制,惟監察人制度無法發揮有效監督力量,為健全公司治理、順應國際潮流趨勢,我國於2006年元月修正證券交易法,將美國單軌制之獨立董事及董事會中功能性委員會制度移植納入我國法制,增訂證券交易法第14條之2至第14條之5規定,運作上呈現全新風貌。 然而,我國在引進屬於單軌制之獨立董事與審計委員會制度時,卻也因折衷妥協適應我國情況所作之調整而自動「變形」,造成適用上產生諸多問題,例如審計委員會定位不清、立於監督角色卻又賦予業務執行權限、授予審計委員會先行審查權卻又可經董事會三分之二以上同意推翻之,此些制度設計造成審計委員會球員兼裁判之問題,甚至產生架空其職權之弔詭現象,容有探究之餘地。 因此,本文以我國公司內部監控機制變革為主,並以審計委員會制度為核心,嘗試比較、分析我國法及美國法關於審計委員會制度之設計與配套措施,輔以相關學說文獻及實務資料,就我國內部監控機制為檢討,瞭解現行法在規範上以及制度上之不足之處,並進一步針對審計委員會制度在我國法上之實踐、改進提出修法建議,使其監督效能得以發揮最大功用,以完整我國內部監控機制。
The goal of “Corporate Governance” is to pursue sound operation and the maximum benefit of the corporation. The tradition in Taiwan is adopting double-track system i.e. supervisors are the interior moni-toring system. However, supervisors in Taiwan had not directed the system effectively. To enhance Corpo-rate Governance and conform to the international trend, Taiwanese government amended Securities Ex-change Act in January, 2006 and took single-track system from the U.S. They added “Independent Director” and the functional committee system to Securities Exchange Act §14-1 to §14-5 which made the Act have a whole new look. Nevertheless, when Taiwanese government introduced the new system, the original one automatically “transformed” since it needed to be adjusted to meet various situations in Taiwan. Thus, it caused lots of problems. For example, the audit committee is in unclear position and will easily referee itself. This thesis focused on the reform of corporate interior monitoring system and the audit committee. Also, we tried to compare and analyze the design of the system and measures of Taiwanese and the U.S.’ Act. By means of the related theories and practice, we reviewed Taiwanese interior monitoring system to understand the insufficiency of current regulation and system. Moreover, we made some suggestion of the amendment of the Act to make audit committee have the greatest function and complete the interior monitoring system in Taiwan.