工資談判、政策賽局與時序不一致

WAGE BARGAINING, POLICY GAME, AND TIME INCONSISTENCY

江秀燕(HSIU-YEN CHIANG)

指導教授 ： 賴景昌

共同指導教授 ： 蕭文宗(WEN-TZONG HSIAO)

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/博士(2011年)

摘要

本論文的特色是融合了工資談判理論、政策賽局與時序不一致三個議題。
政策賽局文獻強調工會是通膨傾向來源之一。此外，依據工資談判理論，若工會的談判力量增加，會導致不完全競爭勞動市場的扭曲程度加劇。
本論文於政策賽局與時序不一致議題中，以工資談判理論分析工會對通膨傾向的影響。本論文藉由增加貨幣當局或財政當局的談判力量，牽制工會的行為，以減緩通膨傾向。
第二章嘗試將工資談判理論納入簡單的政策賽局中，我們藉由管理權模型顯示，央行的談判力量增加，間接地減緩通膨傾向。
第三章與第四章依序以貨幣當局與財政當局採取協調合作，以及財政當局與工會採行協調合作的方式，納入時序不一致的議題中。我們發現央行官員的保守程度提高對通膨傾向的影響雖無法確定，但會造成社會福利下降。然而，我們提高財政當局對政府支出比率的偏好權數、工會對通膨的偏好權數，或增加財政當局談判力量，不但減緩通膨傾向且促進社會福利的提升。第三章與第四章也發現央行官員對通膨的趨避程度無法引起通膨與產出的波動。再者，通膨與產出的波動彼此無抵換關係，此結果違反Rogoff的命題。

關鍵字

工會 ； 談判 ； 通膨 ； 貨幣政策

並列摘要

The salient feature of the dissertation is that it is able to deal with three distinct regimes that encompass wage bargaining, policy game, and time inconsistency.
The policy game literature emphasizes that the union is
a crucial force leading to inflation bias. In addition, the wage bargaining theory addresses that the distortion on the imperfectly competitive labor market stemming from the union will become severer if the bargaining power of the union is larger.
Moreover, this dissertation attempts to study the effect of union on inflation bias in the literatures of policy game and time inconsistency featuring wage bargaining theory. It is shown that the inflation bias will be lower when the bargaining power of the monetary or fiscal authority to depress the union’s behavior is increased.
Chapter 2 develops a simple monetary policy game with
wage bargaining. It is revealed that a rise in the central banker’s bargaining power depresses the inflation bias under the right to manage model.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 examine the time inconsistency issues by means of, respectively, coordinated monetary and fiscal authority, and coordinated fiscal authority and union. It is found that a rise in the weight assigned to inflation by the central banker may deteriorate the inflation bias and depresses the social welfare. However, the inflation bias is mitigated and the social welfare can be enhanced if we raise (i) the fiscal authority’s weight assigned to the government spending ratio, (ii) the union’s concern about inflation, or (iii) the bargaining power of fiscal authority.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we also find that the inflation aversion of the central banker plays no role in the inflation or output fluctuations. Moreover, in contrast to the Rogoff’s Proposition, we find there is no policy trade-off between the inflation and output stability.

並列關鍵字

TRADE ； BARGAINING ； INFLATION ； MONETARY POLICY

參考文獻

Acocella, N. and G. Di Bartolomeo (2004), “Non-Neutrality of Monetary Policy in Policy Game,” European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 695-707.

Acocella, N. and G. Di Bartolomeo (2007), “Is Corporatism Feasible?” Metroeconomica, 58, 340-359.

Acocella, N., G. Di Bartolomeo, and P. Tirelli, (2007), “Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Coordination in a Monetary Union,” Economics Letters, 94, 56-63.

Acocella, N., G. Di Bartolomeo, and W. Pauwels, (2009b), “Is There Any Scope for Corporatism in Macroeconomic policies?” Empirica, 8, 1573-6911.

Alesina, A. and L. H. Summers, (1993), “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25, 151-162.