自2001年底的恩隆案(Enron)開始,到世界通訊(WorldCom)、博達案、力霸案以及最近的雷曼兄弟破產,一連串爆發的會計醜聞,暴露出主理人和代理人間存有嚴重之利益衝突而導致嚴重的代理問題。而根據過去之文獻發現,代理成本較高的公司會向外尋求較大型的會計師事務所查核,以藉由較高品質的審計來降低代理成本。而由於大型會計師事務所提供高品質之審計,投入較多的查核成本,因而收取較高的審計公費。故本文之主旨即在探討審計公費的決定與代理成本間之關連。 本研究根據Jensen (1986,1989)所提出之自由現金流量與債務假說,即低成長機會且擁有較高自由現金流量之公司所產生之代理問題較嚴重,且藉由向外舉債可有效降低代理成本之觀點,並參照Gul and Tsui (1998)之研究模型,以自由現金流量作為代理成本之代理變數,以自由現金流量與舉債之交乘項來衡量舉債對降低代理成本之益處,以國內數據驗證Jensen (1986,1989)之理論。另由於國內審計公費之存有揭露不完整之問題,因而採取Heckman (1979)提出之兩階段模型進行實證,以控制國內自我選擇揭露審計公費之問題。 本研究以91年至97年在台灣的上市、上櫃公司為樣本,實證結果顯示,與預期相符的,在控制我國自我選擇揭露審計公費之影響後,國內的會計師事務所對於低成長機會且擁有較高自由現金流量之公司會收取較高的審計公費,另發現同屬低成長機會且高自由現金流量之公司,會計師對於高舉債者會收取相對較低的審計公費。而這些情形在高成長機會之公司並不顯著。
The main purpose of this research is to examine the influence of free cash flows and debts which are the proxies of agency costs on audit fees. Based on the theory of free cash flows and debts monitoring hypotheses by Jensen (1986; 1989) that those companies with low growth opportunity and high free cash flow tend to induce a more severe agency problems but by debts, agency costs, it can be effectively reduced. Starting from Enron at the end of year 2001 to WorldCom, Porda, Rebar and the recent bankruptcy of Lehman’s brother, these accounting scandals have shown the severe agency problems caused by the conflicts of interests between the agents and the principals. Follow Gul and Tsui (1998), we use free cash flows and debts as two variables to proxy agency costs. Besides, we use a two-stage model by Heckman (1979) to analysis and control the problem of incomplete disclosure of audit fees in Taiwan. Research samples are collected from the publicly traded companies between 2002 and 2008 in Taiwan. As expected, after we control for the self-selection disclosure on audit fees, we found that audit fees are higher for those firms with lower growth opportunity and higher free cash flows. In addition, we also found that the previous findings are weaker as the firms’ debts increase; that is, auditors are charged less audit fees to their clients who have with higher debts.