公司治理特性對資訊移轉的影響

The Effects of Corporate Governance Characteristics on Information Transfers.

古欣巧(Hsin-Chiao Ku)

指導教授 ： 黃瓊慧

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

Ball and Brown證實資訊內涵以來，國內外便有許多學者開始研究盈餘與股價的關係，盈餘的發布不只會影響發布公司本身的股價，由於產業的同質性也會影響到同業其他公司的股價，此為資訊移轉的現象。另外，近年來企業弊案接二連三的爆發，投資人損失慘重，各國政府開始積極宣導公司治理的重要，因此本研究從資訊移轉的角度，探討公司治理特性對投資人決策的影響。

本研究主旨在探討公司治理特性與資訊移轉之關聯，樣本期間為2006年至2012年，以公司治理架構三個面向，即股權結構、董事會特性、機構投資人，探討公司治理的內部機制對投資人的影響。此外，也從公司治理的外部機制進行探討，以資訊揭露評鑑系統的揭露程度為資訊透明度的代理變數，藉以了解資訊透明度與投資人決策的關聯。

研究結果發現，台灣同業間確實存在資訊移轉的現象，公司治理特性中的控制股東掌握董監席次比例愈大、控制股東掌握董席次比例與現金流量權比例的偏離程度愈小、獨立董事席次比例愈大、獨立監察人席次比例愈大會減弱資訊移轉的效果。然而，董事會規模愈大、機構投資人持股比例愈高則會強化資訊移轉的效果。

關鍵字

公司治理、資訊透明度、資訊移轉

並列摘要

Since Ball and Brown confirmed information content, many domestic and foreign scholars began to study the relationship between earnings and stock price.The release of earnings does not only affect their own company share price but also affect the price of other companies in the same industry due to the homogeneity of the industry. That is called information transfer. In addition, many corporate scandals happened in recent years and investors suffered heavy losses.Each countries government began to advocate importance of corporate governance. Therefore, this study investigates the effects of corporate governance characteristics on investor decisions from the perspective of information transfers.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and information transfers. The sample period is from 2006 to 2012. It investigates the internal mechanisms of corporate governance impact on investors by corporate governance framework through three dimensions, ownership structure, board characteristics, institutional investors. In order to understand the relationship between information transparency and investor decisions, this study uses the result of information disclosure and transparency rankings system in Taiwan as a proxy for information transparency in external mechanisms of corporate governance.

The empirical results show the existence of intra-industry information transfer phenomenon. When the ratio of board seats held by the members of the largest shareholders is higher, the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the divergence between the largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights is lesser, the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the ratio of independent director seats held by the members of the largest shareholders , the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the ratio of independent supervisor seats held by the members of the largest shareholders are higher, the effect of information transfers is weaken. However, the larger size of the board and the higher proportion of institutional ownership will strengthen the information transfer effect.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance、 Information Transparency、Information Transfer

參考文獻

9. 黃瓊慧、許周全，2001年，機構投資人對自願性盈餘預測之影響，

1. 王淑瑩，1992年，盈餘宣告所含資訊內容暨訊息移轉效果之研究，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。

10. 黃瓊慧、李先莉，2007年，How Do Investors React to the Releases of the Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System， Annual Conference of Taiwan Finance Association

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