我國歷年在國際上的廉政排名不理想,近年更有惡化趨勢,顯示我國有改進的空間。香港與新加坡,在實施廉政專責機關政策後,讓極度貪腐的政府脫胎換骨。本研究運用文獻分析法、深度訪談法和比較研究法進行分析我國和香港廉政公署(ICAC)、新加坡貪腐調查局(CPIB)的廉政機關結構。並以組織定位、行政意向、社會民意、政黨政治和議程設定五種可行性,分析探討我國成立廉政專責機關的可行性,提出具體建議。 在組織定位可行方面,廉政集所有事權於一個專責機關,稱為集中制,將事權分散多個專責機關,稱為分散制。首長制或委員制,獨立性或行政一體性,各有利弊得失。行政意向可行方面,在本位主義和權力結構消長衝擊之下,機關內部利害關係人的反對和機關間彼此的爭鬥,形成一個阻礙因素。社會民意可行方面,雖然超過七成的社會民意贊成,但共識不強烈,無法成為建立廉政專責機關的觸動樞紐。政黨政治可行方面,目前各政黨的共識是強化現有的機關資源,並建立一個橫向溝通機制,不設立廉政專責機關。議程設定可行方面,目前無政策方案送立法機關審議,政策流程無法形成,各政黨的立法委員反對設立,政治流程也無法形成,只有問題流程,無法開啟政策櫥窗。 提出建立我國廉政專責機關的政策和執行建議:短期可行方案是維持現狀強化現有功能並建立各機關橫向聯繫機制,中長期理想方案是監察院廉政公署化的形塑,備選替代方案是法務部廉政署方案。
Over the years, Taiwan’s performance is not quite satisfactory in the international ranking of the Independent Commission against Corruption. It is even worse in recent years. On the contrary, by built up the Independent Commission against Corruption organization for anti-corruption, the corruption in Hong Kong and Singapore is improved dramatically. This study analyzed the anti-corruption organizations of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore by using document analysis, in-depth interview and comparative method. Then, this study discussed five aspects including organizations positioning, administrative intention, social opinion, party politics and agenda-setting to analyze the feasibility for establishment of Anti-Corruption Agency in Taiwan. From organizations positioning point of view, centralization system such as Anti-Corruption Agency that has all governance power with it and dispersion system that disperses governance power to many organizations have their pro and con. From administrative intention aspect, the departmentalism and power struggle between internal stakeholders and opponents form the hindrance factors. From social opinion aspect, in spite that more than 70% of citizen is in favor of forming a dedicated organization for anti-corruption, but the consensus is not intense enough to drive government to do it. From party politics aspect, the consensus of KMT & DPP is to strengthen existing organizations by forming a lateral communication mechanism instead of establishing the Anti-Corruption Agency. From agenda-setting aspect, no related bill draft was sent to legislature as well as the legislators’ opposition from all parties, therefore the policy stream can not be formed. Since that, only the problem stream can not open the policy window. This study suggests that by strengthening the existing functions and establishing a lateral communication mechanism between related organizations to improve it in short term. In long term, the ideal solution is to form an Anti-Corruption Agency owned by Control Yuan. An alternative solution is owned by Department of the Ministry of Justice.