價格管制下的品質競爭

Quality competition under price regulation

王思捷(Szu-Jieh Wang)

指導教授 ： 龔治齊

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

論文內容提要：
　　在不考慮價格與區位競爭的簡化假設下，本研究於一結合水平與垂直競爭的雙占品質賽局模型中，探討影響品質均衡的因素。相對於傳統文獻中的簡單成本函數設定，本研究發現品質與邊際生產成本間之成本互補決定了品質變數的策略互補與替代，從而決定了比較靜態分析的結果。
　　具體而言，不論廠商同時或先後決定品質，若品質變數間彼此為策略互補，則利他程度、廠商自身價格對品質均有正向效果，而運費具有負向效果。但若品質變數為策略替代，則上述結果可能會反轉。

關鍵字

Cournot競爭 ； 策略替代 ； 策略互補 ； 成本互補 ； 成本替代 ； 品質競爭 ； 產品差異化 ； Stackelberg競爭

並列摘要

Abstract
This thesis explores the determinants of equilibrium quality provision in a single stage quality duopoly game, which combines both horizontal and vertical product differentiation with given price and location. In contrast with the simple cost function specification in the literature, we find that it is the cost substitutability (complementarity) between quality and marginal production cost that causes the strategic complements (substitutes) between the quality variables, which in turn affects the comparative statics results.
More specifically, in either Cournot or Stackelberg quality competition, high degree of altruism, higher own regulated price, and lower transportation costs will increase firm’s own equilibrium quality. Yet the above results may be reversed if there are strategic substitutes between the quality variables.

並列關鍵字

Cournot competition ； strategic complements (substitutes) ； cost substitutability (complementarity) ； Quality competition ； Product differentiation ； Stackelberg competition

參考文獻

Anderson,P and Neven,D. (1991)“Cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration”International Economic Review,VoL.32,pp.793~808

Brécard, D. (2008) “Specific versus ad valorem taxation in a differentiated oligopoly”,mimeo.

Crampes,C and Hollander,A.(1995) "Duopoly and Quality Standards", European Economic Review, vol. 39, Elsevier, 1995, pp. 71-82.

D’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J., and Thisse, J. (1979) “On Hotelling’s stability in competition. ”Econometrica VoL.47,pp.1145~1150

McCannon , B. (2008) “The Quality–Quantity Trade-off.”Eastern Economic Journal, 2008, VoL.34, pp.95~100