考慮跨階段移轉影響的集團間競賽模式之競租分析

The Carryover Effect in The Group Competition for Rents

朱峻廷(Chun-Ting Chu)

指導教授 ： 翁仁甫

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

現今既有的文獻有探討多階段競租架構與競租浪費，亦有討論集團間的競租架構，然而，將跨階段移轉效果導入集團間的競租活動，以及其變化是否對集團成員於各階段競租投入產生影響，尚未有文獻考慮且進行比較。

本文擬參考Kate and Tokatlidu (1996)的模型架構，將跨階段移轉效果導入進行分析，並針對集團內個別成員如何決定兩階段競租活動的投入比例，以及獲勝團體於首階段獲勝後，進入到次階段時，其租利分配策略是否考量個別成員在首階段的競租投入程度，進行模型推導分析。此外，針對Hausken(2012)對傳統兩階段集團間競租模型的分析結論所提出質疑，本研究將跨階段移轉效果導入該模型架構，所得結論可以解決Hausken對於首階段競租投入水準偏低的質疑。

關鍵字

跨階段移轉效果 ； 集團競賽 ； 競租

並列摘要

In existing literature, never has a rent-seeking analysis and comparison been demonstrated that whether the variation of the carryover effect in the group rent-seeking contest will affect rent dissipation in each stage.

The thesis took the paper “Group competition for rents” published by Kate and Tokatlidu (1996) as reference and considered the carryover effect in the rent-seeking structure. Moreover, this research will focus on how groups’ members distribute their rent outlays in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest, and whether the winning group consider members’ outlays in the first stage to distribute the rents. In addition, this research also aims to solve that Hausken (2012) concluded the first stage’s outlays could be extremely low in the two-stage group rent-seeking contest.

並列關鍵字

carryover effect ； group competition ； rent-seeking

參考文獻

蔡攀龍、張寶塔 (2005)，《個體經濟學》，聯經出版公司。

Baik, & Shogren, Jason F. (1995). Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests. Public Choice, 83: 113-126.

Baik, Kyung Hwan, & Kim, In-Gyu. (1997). Delegation in contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 13: 281-298.

Congleton, Roger D, Hillman, Arye L, & Konrad, Kai A. (2008). Forty years of research on rent seeking: an overview. The Theory of Rent Seeking: Forty Years of Research, 1.

Hausken, Kjell. (2012). On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts. Economics Letters, 116: 504-507.