不對稱資訊下參與預算問題之分析性研究

Analytical study of the issues about the participative budgeting under asymmetric information

陳世佳(Chen-Shih Chia)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本研究探討在資訊不對稱的情形下企業與部門間參與預算之相關問題。參與預算制度是由上下各層級主管或員工一貣參與編製預算，編製方式通常是由下往上彙總編製而成，讓下層員工也有機會參與預算之編製。本研究以企業高階主管與部門作為分析對象進行探討，發現在一般情況下，低成本部門因有成本優勢，有動機模仿高成本部門來藉此獲得額外報酬；而企業可藉由設立機制來防止低成本部門的模仿行為。 為了探討部門間行為是否會互相影響，本研究假設企業面臨頇在兩部門中遣散其中一部門的情形下，分析部門與企業的行為模式；在研究中，假設企業有兩種方案可以選擇，一是限制部門成本一旦確定後在未來即不能改變，第二則是未來每一期的成本皆獨立不受限制。本研究發現當部門面臨遣散壓力時，部門行為模式會有所改變，不僅有低成本部門會有模仿高成本部門之動機，高成本部門也可能為了規避遣散風險而有模仿低成本部門的動機。另外，在遣散兩部門之一的前提下，本研究針對觀察時間與未來繼續服務時間對高低成本部門進行分析，發現在長期的生產合約中，企業較不適合限制部門成本，規定其不能改變成本高低；宜採用每期成本獨立方式來給付部門薪酬，藉此增加企業報酬。

關鍵字

分析性研究 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 參與預算

並列摘要

The purpose of this research is to discuss participative budgeting under asymmetric information. Participative budget is a budgeting progression in which those who are impacted by departmental budgets are actively involved in the budget formation process and it is normally conducted with a bottom-up approach. Although it incurs more agency costs than a top-down budgeting approach, a bottom-up budgeting approach provides lower-level employees with more opportunities to participate in the process of budgeting. With cost advantages, low-cost departments tend to imitate high-cost departments for additional payoffs. Therefore, executives should set up proper mechanisms in order to prevent such behaviors. To further investigate if departments’ behaviors would affect each other under participative budgeting, this study assumed that enterprises need to dismiss one of the two departments. The result showed that when departments are under the pressure of being terminated, they tend to change their behaviors accordingly. Not only do the low-cost departments have the motivation to duplicate the policies of high-cost departments, but also the high-cost departments have the motivation to imitate the policies of low-cost departments to avoid the chance of being dismissed. In addition, the study analyzed the effects to both low and high cost departments when the time of observation and the remaining time to serve the enterprise varies. The result showed that when we deal with long-term production contracts, adopting independent cost strategy can benefit the enterprises .

並列關鍵字

Information Asymmetry ； Participative Budgeting ； Analytical Study

參考文獻

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