以產權及交易成本分析都市更新與土地徵收

自2003年起，台灣社會上發生多起針對土地使用產生的糾紛，有關土地徵收的糾紛有從最早的樂生療養院、相思寮到最近的南投大埔事件，都市更新的部分則有華光社區、永春都更、正義國宅，到最近才落幕的文林苑等等。這兩者都是將土地轉作提高產值的方式，我想一併探討其中法規及實行上有何疏失或闕漏，及討論改善方法。本文以產權及交易成本去分析討論土地徵收及都市更新，主要方法以研讀大量法院判決後，歸納整理出法官對於公益私利之衡量標準，後模擬若改變土地徵收及都市更新之產權結構或交易成本，是否有助於這兩者在實行上的順暢。　　在土地徵收的章節，以徵收完成後土地使用的階段為主要探討的部分：發現需地機關若沒有在期限內依原徵收用途使用該土地時，原地主可依法聲請收回土地，但若該地上已有建物，則法官會將地上建物之價值與其供公之使用人次、人數當作公益之客觀依據，以情況判決之適用駁回原地主之聲請收回，因在返還土地所有權時必須拆除所有地上建物，故若判該土地返還，將造成公益之重大損害。由此可見台灣法院是把土地的所有權利包裝成一個，而不分離判屬。若採權利分離判屬，將土地所有權返還與原地主，使用權判與需地機關，使兩者締結契約關係，則可不拆除地上建物，即不使公益有重大損害，不過此法不可行之處在於，有過高的風險成本造成未來租金調漲或其他原因導致該契約關係的消滅，故現行制度將權利綑綁而不分離判屬的制度較佳。　　在都市更新的章節，前半段討論都更條例是否具有法律上的正當性，後半段討論權利變換機制在都更流程中扮演的角色，發現權利變換機制會導致實施者有誘因同時提高建物更新後總產值或提高共同負擔，後者易產生權利人與實施者間的不信任；另，權利變換之估價過程，從委託哪幾家估價師到選取哪份估價報告皆由實施者主導，權利人只能事後被告知，加上沒有客觀的市價基準可供參考，這些都導致都更過程中權利人易產生異議。若與傳統合建模式相比，都市更新確實有較多的建物更新後產值，但其在實行上也耗費相當大的成本，像是協商成本及實施成本等等。在降低都市更新成本的方法上，政府方面可採地價實價登錄，或在法規上參考德國作法，針對相對於一般人民受到更大侵害的個案給予更多補償，但以上可行的方法皆會同時提高其他交易成本，故儘管都市更新建物更新後產值遠超過傳統合建，但其需付出成本也相對高很多，若要比較兩者優劣，結果應依個案不同而有不同結果。

關鍵字

土地徵收；都市更新；交易成本；產權

並列摘要

Urban renewal and land expropriation embody essentially the same nature because they both are the ways of altering land use in order to raise the final output. That's way I put them together, trying to discover what kind of property right structures they are and what flaws of the law/rules are going to be. In this thesis, I pick some representative cases to show what the judges' views are and sum up what kinds of standard they would take when comparing public interest with self interest. Then I simulate the possible ways to reduce the transaction costs to see the following results. In the chapter of land expropriation, I found that the judges would tend to use circumstantial judgments, which means they admit the way of land use the government enforced is illegal but still can't retract the original action, when they think it's too harmful for the public interest to return the right to exclude to the original land owner. We can tell from these cases that in Taiwan the judges regard the property rights of land as a tie-in package which can't be separated. Then we tried to separate the property rights, leaving the right of use to the government and returning the right of exclude to the original land owner, and let themselves build a leasing relationship for it won't harm the public interest. But it will cost much to do so since the rent is hard to be priced and the land owner may raise the rent someday which the government can't afford then. That's why I think it's better to maintain status quo. In the chapter of urban renewal, I divide this issue into two parts. At the first part, I discuss whether the Urban Renewal Act fits procedural justice. At the second part, I focus on the role of rights transformation played in the process of urban renewal and find the rules of rights transformation will widen the distrust between land owners and the implementer since (1) the role of land owners is absent in the property price-estimated process, (2) land owners lack relevant information to know whether their property assessments are fairly estimated or not, (3) the implementers have incentive to narrow the proportion of property value of land owners. Then I raise some methods to reduce the preceding transaction cost, but all of them will increase other transaction cost. Although the profit of implementing urban renewal with the rights transformation is so high, the costs of doing so are too heavy for the traditional joint construction agreement to bear. It’ll depend on each specific case to tell whether it’s better to adopt traditional joint construction agreement or urban renewal with rights transformation.

並列關鍵字

land expropriation ； urban renewal ； transaction cost ； property rights

參考文獻

2. 林美娟（2005），《都市更新權利變換制度實施之研究—以台北市更新重建個案為例》

6. 黃兆偉（2012），《從財產權保障論我國土地徵收法制中公共利益要件之界定》

9. 楊松齡、卓輝華（2011），《從產權分離探討都市更新之激勵機制》

7. 黃國榮（2012），《都市更新權利變換估價問題與權益分配之探討》

8. 楊艾嘉（2004），《都市更新地區與周圍地區房價差異因素之探討—以台北市為例》

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以產權及交易成本分析都市更新與土地徵收

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