董事會結構與盈餘管理關聯性之研究

The Relationship between Board structure and Earning Management

古佳雯(Chia-Wen Ku)

指導教授 ： 呂麒麟 ； 洪嘉聲

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6828/KSU.2005.00031

摘要

世界銀行於1999年指出公司治理之內部機制主要以董事會為核心，負責監督公司之高階管理階層，以維護所有股東之利益，足見董事會在公司治理上扮演重要的角色。Fama (1980)[15]亦提到董事會有助於股東監督管理人，減少代理問題。Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)[16]研究中指出，經理人因經營環境的不同，會利用裁決性應計項目以從事盈餘管理的行為。本研究欲探討董事會結構與經理人從事盈餘管理行為之關聯性。實証結果發現，就整體而言，董事會結構與盈餘管理具有一定的關聯性，獨立董監事確實顯著的減少盈餘管理；在未達到盈餘目標時，董事會規模增加了盈餘管理，反之則減少盈餘管理，與預期方向相符但均不顯著。另外，具財務背景之獨立董監事與盈餘管理行為未有顯著相關性。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 獨立董監事 ； 董事會結構 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

From the suggestion of the World Bank in 1999, the board structure is the main part of corporate governance, which has show the important role of board composition in corporate governance. Fama (1980) [15]show the board composition is helpful to monitor the activity of manager and reduce the agency problems. According to the study of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)[16], the manager will use the discretionary accruals to manage the earning under different circumstance. In this study we explore the relationship between the board composition and earning management activities. Our empirical results show the independent members of broad have negative relationship with earning management. Before reached the goal of earnings, the board size has positive relationship with earning management and vice versa. Besides, the members with financial background have no significant relationship with earning management.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； earning management ； Independent board directors ； board composition

參考文獻

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