台股機構投資人對經理人盈餘管理影響之研究

The Monitoring Effect of Institutional Investors on the Manager’s Earning Management in Taiwan Stock Market

向少華(Shao-Hua Hsiang)

指導教授 ： 呂麒麟

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2003年)

https://doi.org/10.6828/KSU.2003.00039

摘要

Fudenberg和Tirole[15]的模型指出，經理人在進行盈餘管理時會考量當期盈餘與下一期盈餘的相對表現。而機構投資人本身擁有專業知識與資源，Maug[20]研究發現當機構投資人對於該公司持股比例高時，會有較少的買賣次數與持有較長的時間，在這種情況下機構投資人會有較大的動機去收集資訊、監控經理人的行動與促成公司較佳的表現。本研究假設台股經理人在不同經營環境下會利用裁決性應計項目來從事盈餘管理，而機構投資人在持股比例較高時會去監控經理人使用裁決性應計項目。所選擇樣本為民國八十五年至民國八十九年在臺灣證券交易所上市公司（不含金融與壽險公司）。本研究採用修正後的Jones的模型[13]來估計裁決性應計項目，以複迴歸模式來驗證機構投資人監控經理人的行為，並利用Newey和West[23]調整程序來降低自我相關所產生的問題。實證結果發現台灣股市中經理人確實存在有盈餘平穩化的行為；而機構投資人也確實扮演了監控經理人的角色。同時為了解機構投資人在何種情境下會積極扮演監控經理人的角色，對不同情境下做敏感度分析；發現高持股的機構投資人在公司股票報酬超越大盤報酬、有正值的EPS、Tobin’Q值大於一或有低研究發展費用支出時，當公司在當期表現佳，在下一期表現不佳時會積極監控經理人使用裁決性應計項目。

關鍵字

機構投資人 ； 盈餘管理

並列摘要

Because the institutional investors have professional knowledge and resources, they played an important role on the corporate governance. The model of Fudenberg and Tirole [15] show that the managers have incentives to smooth earnings in the consideration of both current and future relative performance. Maug [20] found that when the shares of institutional investors hold are relative high, they have relative less transactions and longer holding period. Under this condition, the institutional investors have incentives to monitor the managers’ activities for better performance. In this study, we assume the managers, under different operating conditions, will manipulate the accruals to manage the earnings, and the substantial institutional shareholdings will curtail these behaviors. Our empirical results show there existed significant earnings smoothing behaviors in Taiwan stock market, consistent with Lin, Shiue and Su [4], and the institutional investors played a monitoring role. The sensitive analysis show that the institutional shareholdings have significant monitoring effect on the firms with positive abnormal returns, positive EPS, Tobin’Q greater than one and serious agency problems, when the current performance was good and future was bad.

並列關鍵字

institutional investors ； earning mnagement

參考文獻

[1] 王元章，王耀賢，“從競賽觀點探討基金經理人風險調整行為”，財務金融學刊，第6卷第3期，1999年，第25頁-62頁。

[12] Chung, R., M. Firth and J.B. Kim, “Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earning Management,” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.8, 2002, pp.29-48.

[13] Dechow, P., R.G. Sloan and A.P. Sweeney , “Detecting Earnings Management,” The Accounting Review, vol.70, 1995, pp.193-225.

[14] Defond, M.L. and C.W. Park, “Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earning,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.23, 1997, pp.115-139.

[15] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1995), “A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents,” Journal of Political Economy, vol.103,1995, pp.75-93.