投資型子公司、公司治理及成長機會與公司績效關係之研究

An Empirical Study on the Investment Subsidiary, Corporate Governance and Growth Opportunity on Firm Performance

彭永龍(Yung-Lung Peng)

指導教授 ： 王淑芬

國立交通大學/管理學院/管理學院財務金融學程/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2011.00397

摘要

本研究探討投資型子公司、公司治理及成長機會與公司績效之關聯性。選取樣本公司215家，觀察值2,150筆，研究期間為2000年至2009年，建構9個解釋公司績效的模型，然後選用Panel迴歸方法分析。投資型子公司的定義為企業單獨財務報表長期投資項下之第1層子公司以權益法評價、持股比率50％以上，主要營業項目為創業投資、一般投資、轉投資或控股者，並以機構投資人持股比例及研發支出比率作為公司治理及成長機會之代理變數。實證結果發現：（1）投資型子公司之存在不顯著影響資產報酬率及股價報酬率，但對Tobin’s q為顯著正相關。（2）機構投資人持股比例對資產報酬率及Tobin’s q為顯著正相關，但對股價報酬率無顯著影響。（3）研發支出比率對資產報酬率、Tobin’s q及股價報酬率為顯著負相關。

關鍵字

投資型子公司 ； 機構投資人 ； 研發支出 ； 公司績效

並列摘要

This research explores the relationship between investment subsidiary, corporate governance, growth opportunities and firm performance. A sample of 215 companies containing 2,150 observation data during the period 2000-2009 is used, 9 explaining models for firm performance are constructed, and the panel regression method is chosen in the analysis. Investment subsidiary is defined as the Tier 1 subsidiary under long-term investment on stand-along financial statements with the equity method and is more than 50% shareholding. Moreover, its main business is the venture capital, general investment, reinvestment or holding. Yet, the proportion of institutional investors’ ownership and the ratio of R&D expenditures are separately deemed as proxy variables for corporate governance and growth opportunities. Empirical results indicate that: (1) Investment subsidiary is insignificantly associated with ROA and return on stock price, but there is significant positive effect on Tobin's q. (2) The proportion of institutional investors ownership is significantly positively associated with on ROA and Tobin's q, but there is no significant effect on return on stock price. (3) The ratio of R&D expenditures is significantly negatively associated with ROA, Tobin's q and return on stock price.

並列關鍵字

investment subsidiary ； institutional investors ； research and development expenditures ； firm performance

參考文獻

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