集團股權結構與融資限制對併購決策之影響

The Effects of Ownership Structure in Business Groups and Financial Constraints on M&A Decision

陳佳宜(Chia-Yi Chen)

指導教授 ： 葉銀華

國立交通大學/管理學院/財務金融研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2015.00315

摘要

基於台灣上市櫃樣本中，集團企業比較會去從事併購，而使本篇論文探討集團企業從事併購決策的因素。在集團企業，利用金字塔股權結構而有著席次控制權高、現金流量權低、控制權與現金流量權偏離大，以及存在內部資本市場而使融資限制低之特性，這些因素皆可能影響併購決策，但過去鮮少文獻透過集團企業的特性考量併購之動機。
實證顯示集團席次控制權高與偏離程度大之公司確實較會去併購，可能因為高控制權使公司決策效率高、避免意見不一致之情形；現金流量權低，則與控制股東自身利益較低，使控制股東從事高風險投資；偏離程度較大，可能使控制股東與小股東利益不一致，較易有過度投資與謀求私利之動機。另外，非集團企業有著融資限制，比較不會從事併購活動；但是集團企業擁有內部資本市場，可以降低融資限制，使集團企業即便有著融資限制，仍會去進行併購。
單看集團樣本，集團傾向以上層核心公司進行併購活動，上層核心公司通常規模較大、上市櫃期間長，資金取得較容易。
此外，藉由併購累積異常報酬與長期績效變化(前後3年每股盈餘、股票報酬率之變化)而深究控制股東併購動機之良窳，發現控制股東對公司現金流量權越高，併購後有較大的累積異常報酬、較高的長期獲利能力與公司價值，且高現金流量權之集團企業，併購後獲利能力較佳。

關鍵字

集團股權結構 ； 融資限制 ； 代理問題 ； 併購 ； 事件分析法

並列摘要

In our samples of listed firms in Taiwan, business groups are more likely to merge, and this paper studies what makes them do so. In a business group, there exists ownership structure, which makes business group firms have higher broad seat-control, lower cash flow right and higher divergence between control and cash flow right. There also exists internal capital market, which makes group firms have lower financial constraints. These characteristics may effect decisions of M&A, but there is little research about M&A of business groups.
Evidence shows firms with higher broad seat-control are more likely to merge due to high efficiency of decision, firms with lower cash flow right are more likely to merge since controlling shareholders have lower interest in firm and prefer investment with higher risk, and firms with higher divergence between control and cash flow right are more like to merge due to overinvestment and different benefit from minority shareholders. In addition, firms with lower financial constraints are more likely to merge, but this phenomena does not exists for group firms. In summary, group firms are more likely to merge with higher board seat-control, lower cash flow right and higher divergence between control and cash flow right.
In group firms, central firms are more likely to merge because they are usually listed longer and are usually with bigger size. We examine the motive of controlling shareholders by cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of merging, and find that higher cash flow right leads to positive CAR, higher change in industry-adjusted earnings per share (EPS) and long-term stock return around M&A. We also find that higher cash flow right of group firms leads to higher industry-adjusted EPS after M&A.

並列關鍵字

Business Group ； Ownership Structure ； Financial Constraint ； Agency Problem ； M&A ； Event Study

參考文獻

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