學歷與證照之替代與互補關係:以十三所大學財金系與資管系學生為例

Substitutive or Complementary Relation between Diploma and Certifications

陳秀華(HSIU-HUA CHEN)

指導教授 ： 單驥

國立中央大學/管理學院/產業經濟研究所/碩士(2007年)

摘要

Spence在1973年提出教育訊號理論，該文作者認為，雇主必須藉由可觀察的訊號來判斷員工生產力高低，並且假設教育成本和能力呈負向關係，因此，能力越高者，將會獲得越高之教育；Feltovich, Harbaugh and To在2002年提出「反訊號」理論，高能力者雖然會釋出訊息來和較低能力者區分，但有時會出現不釋出訊息之情形，也就是「反訊號」行為。
本文藉由問卷調查，以13所公私立大學財金系與資管系學生取得證照之情形為例，將學校依95年指定考試成績區分為前段、中段以及後段學校，欲進一步探討前段學校在證照訊息的取得上，是否會出現「反訊號」行為？也就是排名越前面之學校，其學生是否越不重視在畢業前取得證照？而學歷與證照上是否存在替代或互補的關係？並且何種原因會影響個人對報考證照之投入？
實證結果顯示，前段學校學生較不傾向報考證照，對證照投入成本也為負向且顯著，而後段學校之受訪者，在報考意願上及投入成本都呈正向顯著，就證照這項訊息，前段學校學生相對後段學校而言，本文確實出現「反訊號」之行為，另外，後段學校學生，有較強烈的意願報考證照，他們以取得更多額外的訊息來證明本身能力，考取證照作為一種彌補的工具，此處觀察到後段學校的這群學生，學歷與證照之間有互補的關係存在；並且個人對證照之投入主要會受到「個人成績高低」、「預期額外收益」變數之影響。

關鍵字

教育訊號 ； 證照 ； 反訊號

並列摘要

Educational signaling model was proposed by Michael Spence in 1973. In the paper, he suggested that employers will learn the individual’s productive capabilities by some available information. And the key assumption is that the costs of signaling are negatively correlated with productivity. Then, the one with higher productivity will gain higher education. Countersignal theory was proposed by Feltovich, Harbaugh and To in 2002.The main idea is that high-quality types will signal to differentiate themselves from lower types, but sometimes high types may choose to not signal, or “countersignal”.
In this study, we investigated the students of Financial Department and Information Management Department of 13 major universities in Taiwan to know the students'' willingness of getting certifications. We grouped the above 13 universities into three tiers by their university entrance examination scores to see that if countersignal will happen among the first tier-university students. In addition, we also examine whether there is any substitutive or complementary relation between diploma and certifications? And what are the main reasons that will affect individuals to spend time and effort in getting certifications?
Our empirical results confirm that the first-tier- university students have some reservations in taking the relevant certification tests. On the contrary, the third tier-university students have much stronger willingness in taking relevant certification tests. As such, in this study we can confirm that there exists a complementary relation between diploma and certifications among the third-tier-university students while there exist countersignal phenomena for first-tier-university students.

並列關鍵字

education signal ； certifications ； countersignal

參考文獻

黃心怡，「對人力資本論的再省思：資訊技能訓練與資訊證照取得在勞動市場中的角色」，資訊社會研究(7)，255-270，2004年7月。

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