- 學位論文
存款保險及經理人股票選擇權之風險行為研究
Risk-Taking Behavior in Deposit Insurance and Executive Stock Options
摘要
本論文主要探討在存款保險機制下，存款保險費率設定對銀行風險行為之影響；以及配發經理人股票選擇權時，對經理人風險行為之影響。 全文分為二部份：第一部分是在自願加保存款保險制度下，先以單一費率(flat-rate premium)之存款保險機制，來探討存保費率設定對銀行風險行為之誘因為何？我們得出以下之結論：一、完全消除銀行風險行為之誘因，可能不是社會最適化之狀態，而參加存款保險會誘使銀行增加風險行為；二、強制納保可達到預算平衡以及社會福利最大之目標，因此強制納保制優於自願加保制。最後，我們以多元費率(risk-based premium)之存款保險機制來探討費率設定對銀行風險行為與社會福利之影響，結果發現多元存保費率制可改善存保機構預算以及減緩銀行道德風險行為，並維持高度之社會福利水準。 第二部份為提出一多期可能重定執行價格模型，並考量經理人之離職可能性、風險行為、以及提前執行選擇權等因素，重新評價經理人股票選擇權，並進而討論經理人股票選擇權之誘因效果。結果顯示，在不考量經理人之離職可能時，重定價選擇權具挽留經理人之效果。但若考量經理人離職時，重定價選擇權會誘使經理人離職及提前執行其選擇權。此外，重定價選擇權亦會誘使經理人從事風險行為，但其風險誘因效果較傳統選擇權為弱，其原因應是多期重定價之機制，造成選擇權提前執行可能性增加，進而使得重定價選擇權之風險誘因效果被削弱。最後，本文亦發現放鬆重定價條件會使重定價選擇權價格增加。
並列摘要
This dissertation includes two essays: the first essay discusses the impacts of the deposit insurance premium setting upon the bank’s risk-taking behavior; the second essay examines the influences of the executive’s risk-taking behavior upon the incentive alignment functions in the executive stock options (ESOs). The fist essay analyzes the effect of premium rates on banks'' incentives to join a deposit insurance scheme and their incentives to invest in risky projects under a voluntary deposit insurance scheme. We find that in order to maximize social welfare, the insurance agency must either set the premium rate to be low so as to attract all banks to join the insurance scheme, or not to have the deposit insurance at all. However, the low premium rate in the voluntary scheme does not balance the budget of the deposit insurance. We also show that in the compulsory deposit insurance scheme, however, it is possible to impose an optimal premium rate that can balance the insurance agency''s budget and achieve the highest social welfare. The results also present the dominance of the compulsory scheme over the voluntary scheme in terms of maximizing social welfare and balancing the budget. The second essay proposes a multi-repriceable model, which takes into consideration the departure, risk-taking behavior and early exercise on the part of the executive, to price the executive stock options (ESOs). We build a model with performance-based departure and a repricing mechanism, which differs from the previous setting in other works. We find that the repriceable ESOs value is greater than that in the typical ESOs grant without considering the executive''s departure. This result asserts that the executive retention function of repriceable ESOs is a valid practice. However, when considering the executive''s departure, the repriceable option gives the executive incentives to depart from his company and to exercise his ESOs earlier. Furthermore, the repriceable option also gives the executive an incentive to take risk, and the incentive to take risk in repriceable ESOs is weaker than that in typical ESOs. This result is distinct from the findings in former studies. This outcome may arise from the multi-repriceable mechanism, which results in the executive''s early exercise so as to counteract the risk-taking effect in the repriceable ESOs. We also find that the effect of relaxing the repricing term on the repriceable ESOs'' value is positive.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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