股權結構與投資效率:中國上市公司之多重大股東實證研究

Ownership Structure and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from the Multiple Large Shareholders in China

蔡盈如(Ying-Ju Tsai)

指導教授 ： 洪榮華 ； 陳怡珮

國立中央大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/博士(2014年)

摘要

本研究探討中國多重大股東於不同股權結構及地區發展環境下之投資效率差異。本研究發現：1. 多重大股東可視為有效的內部治理機制,能積極地監督公司而使投資更有效率；此外，當公司類型為非國有時，多重大股東可增加其投資效率；國有公司之多重大股東則對投資效率並無顯著影響。2. 在將第二大股東之身分納入考量後，其結果顯示：第二大股東若為境內法人時，可以進一步增加對公司之監督而提高其投資效率。然而，第二大股東若為境外法人時，會有共謀情形,因而扭曲其投資決策。3. 由於不同地區之發展情況可能有差異，本研究因而進一步將多重大股東與區域發展一同考慮後再行分析。其結果顯示，較佳區域發展環境可提供投資人完善的保護，因此多重大股東在較佳之區域發展環境下，其監督公司之能力提升，導致公司之投資效率因而獲得改善。最後，國有公司之多重大股東在較佳之區域發展環境下，可緩和其政治關係所造成的負面影響，進一步利用其政治優勢獲取更多資源，提高投資效率。

關鍵字

多重大股東 ； 投資效率 ； 區域發展

並列摘要

We investigate the role played by multiple large shareholders (MLS) under different ownership structures and for different degrees of institutional development in investment efficiency. Our results show that the presence of MLS can be perceived playing an efficient monitoring role to improve investment efficiency. Monitoring efficiency of MLS in non-SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) can be enhanced whereas this is not the case with SOEs. Second, the presence of a domestic legal person as the second largest shareholder can exert an internal governance role, enhancing investment efficiency. However, the presence of a foreign legal person as the second largest shareholder may lead to collude with the dominant shareholders, which result in decreased investment efficiency. Third, minority shareholders are better protected in regions with better institutional development. The presence of MLS helps alleviate inefficiency in resource allocation. Finally, better regional development could further reduce the negative impact of political connections in the MLS structure on investment efficiency.

並列關鍵字

Multiple large shareholders ； investment efficiency ； institutional development

參考文獻

Attig, N., El Ghoul, S. and Guedhami, O., "Do multiple large shareholders play a corporate governance role? Evidence from East Asia", Journal of Financial Research, Vol 32, pp.395-422, 2009.

Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D., "The balance of power in closely held corporations", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 58, pp.113-139, 2000.

Berkman, H., Cole, R.A. and Fu, L.J., "Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol 45, pp.1391-1417, 2011.

Burns, N., Kedia, S. and Lipson, M., "Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting", Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol 16, pp.443-455, 2010.

Chen, G.M., Firth, M. and Xu, L.P., "Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China's listed companies", Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol 33, pp.171-181, 2009.