大股東股權、董事會結構與公司價值之關係-中國上市公司之實證

Large Shareholders, Board Structure and Firm Value- Evidence from Chinese Listed-Firms

楊豫台(Yu-Tai Yang)

指導教授 ： 俞海琴

中原大學/商學院/商學博士學位學程/博士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201200019

摘要

中文摘要
本研究探討中國大股東股權、董事會結構與公司價值之關係。因中國大股東股權及董事會結構與西方國家在實際執行上有所不同，值得探討與比較。本文採用Unbalanced Panel Fixed Effects Regression，以中國上市公司1746家(排除金融產業)進行實證分析，發現中國上市公司的大股東股權集中度與離散度水準高時，對監督效率與公司價值具正向顯著效果。若考量大股東的身份與股權時，會發現不同大股東身份，對公司價值的影響程度亦不同，其中國內法人對公司的監督效率比其他股東顯著。股權另一個改革政策在2007年，中國政府企圖將國有股與法人股(非流通股)轉為私有化(可流通股)，稱為股權分置制度，結果確實顯著的影響監督效率與公司價值。
2003年後，中國董事會結構具有非常特殊現象，因為中國政府強制上市公司實施獨立董事制度(one-tier board system)，使原有的監事的監督機制(two-tier board system)轉變為雙監督機制並行，結果造成監督職權重疊。實證結果發現，雙監督機制並行結果對中國上市公司價值具有顯著的負向影響。

關鍵字

大股東身份和董事會結構 ； 大股東股權集中度 ； 大股東股權離散度

並列摘要

This research discusses the relationship among Chinese large stockholder structure, the board structure and the firm value, the shareholding of Chinese large shareholder and board structure have some unique phenomenon different from western countries and using Unbalance Panel Fixed Eeffects Regression investigates the 1746 Chinese listed firms excluding financial industry. Finding when the concentration and deviation of shareholding of large shareholders is high, it may increases the monitoring efficiency and firm value. this paper investigates the factor of identity of large shareholders with shareholding effects on the monitoring efficiency and firm value, the empirical results presents the different shareholding of identities of large shareholders procured different effect on monitoring efficiency such as state-owned shareholder does not impact on monitoring efficiency, but the domestic legal person actually may improve monitoring efficiency in a firm. The Chinese government attempts to transfer the state-owned and legal person shares (non-tradable shares) to privatization (tradable shares) since 2007, finding the Stockholder’s Rights Mounted Cylinder (SRMC) system significantly affects on firm value.
The Chinese board structure has significant reform in 2003, because the Chinese government forces all listed firms to practice the independent directors system (one-tier board system), causing the original signal supervisor’s supervising mechanism (two-tier board system)changes to dual supervising mechanisms. The empirical result finds that the dual supervising system is negative significant effects on firm value. This result is consistence with Benedicte and Zhao(2010). This paper suggests that a firm may choose perfect board structure by themselves in Chinese listed firms.

並列關鍵字

Concentration and Deviation of Shareholding of Large Shareholders ； and Board Structures. ； Identity of Large Shareholders

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