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  • 學位論文

獨占廠商在面臨策略型消費者下的訂價與廣告策略

Pricing and advertising strategy of a monopolistic firm when facing strategic customers

指導教授 : 曾富祥
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摘要


一般而言,當商品在消費者心中的價值,即效用(utility),比商品價格還要高或相等時他們就會購買,但是策略型消費者在這種狀況下卻不一定會購買,因為他們考慮到未來降價的可能性。即策略型消費者會比較當下購買的剩餘(surplus)與未來購買的期望剩餘(expected surplus)何者對自己較有利,才決定要在何時購買。 在本研究中假設零售商之銷售有兩期,且第二期的價格僅有維持原價( p1 =p2 )或降價( p1 > p2 )兩種可能。而消費者的效用是一隨機分配,消費者在考慮本身效用、商品價格、以及第二期購買到商品的機率之下,決定是否要購買或在何時購買。我們探討在各種不同的情況下對消費者購買行為與零售商策略的影響:情況一是消費者不知道第二期的價格與商品數量,僅能以第一期的價格來預想第二期可能的價格;情況二是消費者已知效用函數,但是也僅能以第一期的價格來預想第二期可能的價格;情況三是消費者已知效用函數,且零售商宣告第二期的價格與商品數量;情況四是消費者已知效用函數,但零售商僅宣告商品數量,消費者僅能以第一期的價格來預想第二期可能的價格。 此外我們假設廣告會影響消費者效用分配。接著再針對上述各種情況探討在廣告影響下的零售商策略與消費者行為。

並列摘要


In this study, we discuss a monopolistic retailer’s pricing and advertising strategies when facing strategic customers. In general, the customers will make a purchase when their utilities are equal or more than the price of product. However, the strategic customers may have the different decisions in the same situation, because they consider the possibility of markdown in the future. The strategic customers will evaluate whether making a purchase right now or waiting for sales when making the decision. Therefore, strategic customers may wait for sales even their utilities are more than the full price when they discover that the waiting is more benefic. We assume a monopolistic retailer sells one product in two periods, and he will keep or reduce the price of product in the second period. The customer’s utility is a probability distribution, and they will make the decision by considering their own utility, the price of product, and the probability of product availability in the second period. We discuss the customer’s behavior and the retailer’s strategies in four cases. In case 1, the customers have no idea about the price of second period and the quantity of product. In case 2, the customers can expect the quantity of product by knowing the utility function. In case 3, the retailer announces the price of second period and the quantity of product. In case 4, the retailer only announces the quantity of product. Furthermore, we assume the customer’s utility will be affected by advertisement, and further discuss the foregoing cases with the effect of advertisement.

參考文獻


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