兩種對於思想實驗的看法

Two Thoughts about Thought Experiments

羅采薇(Tsai-Wei Lo)

指導教授 ： 侯維之

國立中正大學/文學院/哲學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

本文旨在探討如何證成 (justify) 人們對於思想實驗的判斷。主要聚焦於兩派主流理論，一派理論來自威廉森 (T. Williamson, 2007)，另一派理論來自市川與賈維斯 (J. Ichikawa & B. Jarvis, 2009)，兩派理論都試圖為人們對思想實驗的判斷提供理據 (justification)。本文主張將兩派理論置於語意取向 (the sematic approach) 的框架下檢視，原因是，第一，符合語意取向條件的理論可以恰當地回應實驗哲學家提出的挑戰：人們對思想實驗的判斷缺乏它應有的規範力 (normative power)。第二，兩派理論提供理據的方式皆是透過提供健全的論證，而這正是語意取向理論能回應實驗哲學家的理由：判斷會被一個具有特定型態的健全論證所支持，因此，人們對思想實驗的判斷具有規範力。採取語意取向的理論需要滿足下列兩個條件：第一，提供一個具有特定架構的健全論證，其結論是對於思想實驗的判斷；第二，提供此論證一個恰當的知識論。本文將分別檢視兩派主流理論是否符合上述兩項條件，並指出，雖然兩派理論都分別提供了健全的論證來支持對於思想實驗的判斷，卻都未能提供恰當的知識論，因而不能回答實驗哲學家的挑戰。

關鍵字

實驗哲學 ； 思想實驗

並列摘要

This thesis is to study how a verdict on a thought experiment is justified. Two major theories of the epistemology of thought experiments, Williamson's and Ichikawa and Jarvis's are under consideration, the current thesis labels the two theories 'the semantic approach', according to which the justification of a verdict on a given thought experiment is gained by a sound argument whose conclusion is the very verdict. How to gain a justification of our verdict on a given thought experiment has been questioned by experimental philosophers. The experimental philosophers raise the doubt that based on what a verdict on a thought experiment can have its normative power. Theories of the semantic approach can respond to this challenge properly, providing that they can satisfy the following two conditions. First, the successfulness of their theories hinges on their separate explanations of why arguments with the respective argument structures are sound. Second, they have to explain how we come to hold, justifiedly, that the premises of these arguments are justified. To meet the objective, this thesis is about whether or not the two major theories satisfy these two conditions. And if not, what fail them.

並列關鍵字

experimental philosophy ； epistemic intuitions ； thought experiments

參考文獻

Ichikawa, J. (2009). Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), 435-443.

Ichikawa, J., & Jarvis, B. (2009). Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction. Philosophical Studies, 142(2), 221-226

Ichikawa, J., & Jarvis, B. (2012). Rational imagination and modal knowledge. Nous, 46, 127-258

Reiss, J. (2009). Counterfactuals, thought experiments, and singular causal analysis in history. Philosophy of Science, 76, 712-723

Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29(1/2), 429-460.