論柏濟之認識資格觀念

On Tyler Burge's Notion of Epistemic Entitlement

鄭凱元(Kai-Yuan Jheng)

指導教授 ： 金凱文 ； 鄭凱元

國立中正大學/文學院/哲學系/博士(2015年)

摘要

本論文探討心理內容理論與知識理論的構成關係與相容性的問題，主要回答「如何提出一種說法可以恰當說明信念內容與信念憑證兩個觀念，同時又能避免理解上的可能衝突？」的問題。知識是合理的真信念，說明知識的觀念一定會需要說明認識憑證的觀念，而要說明憑證的觀念會需要去說明憑證與真信念之間具有的理性的、非偶然的關係。對知識的說明最終不可免的會涉及關於信念之本質的說明。然而，給定某種關於認識憑證的常見說法以及某些關於信念內容的看法，我們將難以理解某些知識類型的認識地位。例如我們似乎難以說明知覺信念如何具有的基礎性認識地位，或者很難恰當地解釋具有經驗內容的自我知識為何會具有先驗、權威性認識憑證。本文藉由討論柏濟 (Tyler Burge) 的認識資格 (epistemic entitlement) 觀念，以及此觀念與其心理理論的構成性關聯來回應這樣的相容性難題。

第一章討論柏濟關於心理內容的理論——反個體論。反個體論主張，許多心理狀態的性質取決於個體與其表徵主題之間的種種關係，某些這樣的關係超出個體的表徵或理解能力之外。在具有經驗性內容的心理狀態類型中，其構成條件之一包括了個體與環境主題之間的非表徵性的因果關係。經驗內容的反個體論可再依照抽象層級與構成上的差異，區分為概念反個體論與知覺反個體論兩種主張。第二章介紹他的認識資格觀念並且專注說明他如何建立知覺信念的認識資格，其中知覺反個體論在知覺資格 (perceptual entitlement) 的構成性說明中扮演了一個關鍵性的角色。第三章則是應用知覺資格的觀念，解決一個關於知覺信念之認識地位的難題。我指出說給定信念式證成觀念以及某些關於知覺信念與知覺狀態的一般看法，會導致一個悖論。解決這個悖論的作法是提出一個有別於證成的認識憑證觀念，在經過分析與比較過幾個可能的主張之後，我顯示出柏濟的知覺資格觀念是一個較適合解決這個悖論的主張。

第四章討論柏濟對自我知識觀念的看法並且說明自我歸屬 (self-attribution) 判斷的認識資格。這樣的認識資格具有知覺資格所沒有的權威性地位，來自於個體作為批判推理者、能夠根據理由而改變心理狀態的理性能力。第五章中接著討論概念反個體論與自我知識觀念可能會有的緊張關係。我指出說兩者的不相容性出自於一種錯誤看待自我的心理狀態、以及誤解了自我歸屬之認識憑證的思考方式。在問題的辯證過程中，某些論證涉及到我們如何說明記憶保存知識的功能與如何決定記憶的內容等問題。我藉由闡述柏濟對記憶之本質的看法以及他關於記憶之認識資格的說法，顯示出記憶的觀念與反個體論兩者之間也是彼此相容的。

根據本文的分析，不同知識類型的認識資格皆能與經驗內容的反個體論彼此相容。因此本文結論說：柏濟的理論是一個可以同時恰當說明信念內容與信念憑證兩觀念的主張。

關鍵字

反個體論 ； 知識論 ； 憑證 ； 記憶 ； 自我知識 ； 知覺信念 ； 知覺 ； 概念 ； 心理內容 ； 認識資格

並列摘要

In this dissertation, I discuss the constitutive relations and compatibility between theory of mental content and theory of epistemology, and attempt to answer the question of 'How to provide a coherent account of content of beliefs and warrant of beliefs, and avoid the possible conflicts in such account?' Knowledge is justified true belief. A proper explanation of knowledge requires an explanation of justification/warrant of belief, therefore an explanation of the rational, non-contingent connections between warrant and true belief. However, given a common explanatory model of warrant and some general views about belief content, it seems we can hardly understand the epistemic status of different types of knowledge, such as perceptual knowledge or self-knowledge. I claim that we can solve this problem of incompatibility by appeal to the notion of epistemic entitlement which is developed by Tyler Burge.

My analysis begins with the discussions of Burge's theory of mental content: the anti-individualism. Anti-individualism claims that the nature of many mental states was determined by the relations between the individual that being in the states and the subject matters which were represented by those states, and some of such relations are unable to be understood or represented by the individual. Anti-individualism of empirical mental states can be divided into anti-individualism of empirical concepts and anti-individualism of perception by the differences among the abstractive levels and constitutive structures in the content of those states.

I then articulate Burge's notion of epistemic entitlement, especially focus on his notion of perceptual entitlement of perceptual belief. In such articulation, I give a formulation of perceptual entitlement and show the constitutive role that anti-individualism of perception plays in this notion. As an application, I use the notion to solve a paradox of the fundamental epistemic status of perceptual belief by showing perceptual entitlement is a proper nondoxastic warrant notion.

On the other hand, bases on a misleading inner-observation account of the way we know our own mental states, it seems there is a tension between anti-individualism of concepts and the warrants of self-knowledge and knowledge relies on memory. By articulating Burge's rejection of observational mode and formulating his rationalist account of the entitlements of self-attributional judgments and beliefs from memory, I show that the tension is merely superficial and could be dissolved with a better understanding of the nature of self-knowledge and memory.

In the end, I conclude that because of the explanation potential of entitlement in different types of knowledge and the arguments support the incompatibility are invalid, Burge's notion of entitlement and his anti-individualism can be qualified as a coherent theory about content and warrant of beliefs.

並列關鍵字

Perceptual Belief ； Memory ； Self-knowledge ； Perception ； Concept ； Mental Content ； Epistemic Entitlement ； Epistemology ； Anti-individualism ； Warrant

參考文獻

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