本研究將針對臺灣2008年至2014年間的金融產業公開發行公司為樣本,探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險與成本僵固性之關聯性。 本研究實證結果發現:(一)在金融產業下,當公司的營業收入淨額下降時,人事成本和非人事成本皆存在著成本僵固的現象。(二)有投保D&O保險之金融產業可能會受到承保公司的監督機制的影響,降低代理問題的產生,而使成本僵固的情況不存在。 金融產業投保D&O保險可能會產生代理問題,或其本身的人事資源、處分資產等調整成本,而使得人事成本與非人事成本存有成本僵固性,但同時承保公司亦會執行監督作業,以減少其需理賠的風險,而降低公司代理問題的產生,讓成本僵固的情況不存在。
In 2003, Anderson et al. (2003) investigated the cost of sticky, whether cost decrease when activity falls smaller than they increase when activity rises by an equivalent amount. And in 2008, firms disclose mandatorily the status about D&O insurance. In this paper, we examining whether the Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance (D&O insurance) makes degree of sticky smaller using data from Taiwan financial industry between 2008 and 2014. We find that, (a) in finance industry, personnel expenses and non-personnel expenses are sticky when firms’ operating revenue decrease. (b) Due to insurance company’s supervision mechanism, firms that insured D&O insurance reduce agency problem and cost stickiness does not exist. Cost stickiness exists in financial industry by agency problem, adjustment costs such as disposal cost, severance pay. When firms insured D&O insurance, insurance company supervise operation and finance of firms to reduce agency problem and cost stickiness does not exist.