本文探討機構投資人投資期間、自願性揭露與分析師盈餘預測的關係,從機構投資人監督公司的角度、偏好的角度,檢視機構投資人持股期間愈短對分析師盈餘預測的影響。本篇假說為機構投資人投資期間較短,分析師盈餘預測傾向高估,實證結果與假說相反,機構投資人持股期間縮短,可減少分析師盈餘預測高估之情形,盈餘預測準確度也會增加,此外,公司自願性揭露程度與分析師盈餘預測高估或低估無顯著關係,但是公司自願性揭露與分析師盈餘預測準確度為顯著正向關係,公司資訊揭露愈透明,盈餘預測準確度愈高。本研究推論,機構投資人為了減少其頻繁買賣股票須面對之風險,會選取分析師盈餘預測較準確之股票進行交易。
This paper examines the relation between institutional investors’ investment horizons, voluntary disclosure and earnings forecast. Using institutional turnover level to capture investor’s trading horizons, we find that a decrease in the holding period of institutional investors is associated with the low probability of overestimated earnings forecast, which is in the direction opposite from our assumption. No significant relationship exists between the corporate voluntary disclosure level and overestimated / underestimated earnings forecast, but there is a significant relationship between the corporate voluntary disclosure level and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. The more transparent information disclosure, the more earnings forecast accuracy.