- 學位論文
盈餘管理再省思:以間接盈餘管理剖析企業經營策略目標
Earnings Management Reconsideration：An Indirect Earnings Management Approach upon Analyzing Firm’s Management Objective
摘要
盈餘管理並非僅限於直接調整當期會計數字，亦可透過其它間接管道，如Schrand and Walther（2000）認為公司管理者會藉由報導前期盈餘之非經常性損益以改變比較基準，使本期宣告之盈餘數字呈現最有利的變動，進而改變投資人或報表閱讀者對本期盈餘的價值認知。此種策略性之附註揭露行為，本研究稱之為間接盈餘管理。 本研究以臺灣股票上市公司為研究對象，觀察其所宣告之年度財務報告，分析所欲達成之經營策略目標係為極大化、平穩化抑或是兩者兼具之雙重策略目標；並針對策略性提醒前期處分投資損益及處分資產損益之樣本公司與產業平均值進行實證研究。本研究採用成對差異t檢定及無母數Wilcoxon符號等級檢定法進行檢定，並以邏吉斯迴歸分析法找出相關性，以期幫助投資者更準確地判斷上市公司管理者之經營策略目標與其公司特質。 實證結果顯示，第一，公司管理者是精明的，其經營策略目標並非傳統學理上之二分法，即極大化目標或平穩化目標；透過間接盈餘管理工具，大部分公司會採行同時達成極大化及平穩化之雙重策略目標。第二，公司經營策略目標非為恆定不變，公司管理者會依各年度狀況之不同而在各種經營策略目標之間游移。第三，規模較大的公司，因須承擔更多的社會責任，其政治成本較高且更需考量與供應商、顧客、債權人… …等外部人士關係的維持，故傾向藉由提醒前期利得來達到極大化或雙重策略目標。第四，公司獲利能力較低時，公司管理者會避免報導損失，期使盈餘達到最佳狀態。故會傾向藉由提醒前期利得，以達極大化或雙重經營策略目標。
並列摘要
Earnings management is not limited to adjust the current accounting numbers directly and it can through other indirect channels, such as Schreand and Walther (2000) that was considered corporate administrator will report the nonrecurring items of prior earnings to adjust the benchmark let earnings numbers showed the most beneficial variation at current announcement, and then change investor or statement readers’ value recognition of current earnings. The strategic reference disclosure behavior is called indirect earnings management in this study. The research objects of this study are the listed companies in Taiwan and observe announced annual financial report, analyze desired achievement of firm’s management objective whether it’s the Maximizing, smoothing or the combination of dual strategic objects; and focus on strategic reminding sampling corporate and industries average of prior disposal investment G/L (gains and losses) and disposal assets G/L to proceed empirical research. This study adopt Paired Sample t test and Wilcoxon Signed-rank test for examination and use Logistic Regression Analysis to find out the correlation to help investor to accurately judge listed companies administrators’ firm’s management objective and its corporate’ characteristics as expectation. As empirical results showed, first, corporate administrators are intelligent, its Firm’s management objective are not dichotomy as traditional methodology of Maximizing and stabilities’ objects. Through indirect earnings management tools, almost corporate will adopt the dual strategic objects to achieve Maximizing and stabilities. Second, the corporate firm’s management objective are not permanence change, corporate administrators will do some change of each firm’s management objective based on each different annual condition. Third, the large size corporate should take more social responsibilities to cause higher political costs and consider the maintenance of external relationships with suppliers, customers, debtee…etc., and tend to use prior benefits reminding to achieve the Maximizing or dual strategic objects. Four, when corporate profitability is low, corporate administrators will avoid report losses and expect earnings to reach the best condition. It will tend to use prior benefits reminding to achieve the Maximizing or dual strategic objects.