- 學位論文
董監事暨重要職員責任保險與分析師盈餘預測品質關係之研究
The Relationship between Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Quality
摘要
本研究主要目的係探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(D＆O責任險)與分析師盈餘預測品質之關聯性，以臺灣2009年至2015年之上市櫃公司為研究樣本，實證結果發現，相較於未投保D&O責任險之公司，已投保D&O責任險之公司，其分析師盈餘預測品質較佳，D&O責任險與分析師追蹤人數呈現顯著正向相關，而D&O責任險與分析師盈餘預測誤差及離散性則呈現顯著負向相關。研究結果顯示公司投保於D&O 責任險具有激勵誘因效果，有助於改善公司資訊品質，並促使分析師提高其盈餘預測品質。此外，執行Heckman (1979) 兩階段方法及檢測投保D&O責任險異常金額以控制內生性問題後，仍獲得一致的結果。整體而言，本研究結果建議公司投保D＆O責任險對董監事暨重要職員的激勵誘因效果大於其道德風險危機，並可提高分析師的盈餘預測品質以降低公司內外部資訊不對稱之風險。
並列摘要
The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts for publicly listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2009 to 2015. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance compared to firms without D&O insurance represent better analysts’ earnings forecasts quality. There is a significant and positive association between D&O insurance and the number of analysts’ following the firm. The errors and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts are significantly negatively related to D&O insurance. This evidence means that the firms insured D&O insurance have incentive motivation effects on improving the quality of information disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. In addition, we perform the two-stage estimation in Heckman (1979) and test the abnormal amount of D&O insurance to control for potential endogeneity. The results are still supported. Overall, our findings support the view that the incentive motivation effect is greater than moral hazard problems of D&O insurance for the directors and officers. Moreover, the impact of D&O insurance on the higher quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts is economically important, implying the reduction of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders.