This study investigates the influence of political connections on board, directors’ and officers’ (hereafter D&Os) liability insurance on internal control weaknesses in a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the 2008-2017 period. The empirical evidence shows that politically connected firms are more likely to disclosure internal control weaknesses (hereafter ICWs) than that of non-politically connected firms. This study also examines the relationships between three types of political ties and the disclosure of ICWs. The results document that firms with elected representatives or members of political party on board positively influence the occurrence of ICWs. In addition, firms with D&Os liability insurance could decrease the incidence of internal control weaknesses and improve the efficiency of governance. However, the effect of D&Os liability insurance on governance could be depressed and the internal control quality could not be improved by the political tie effects for those of politically connected firms with D&Os liability insurance.