餐飲外送平臺補貼策略與訂閱機制之探討-以A餐廳為例

Subsidy Strategy and Subscription Mechanism for Food Delivery Platforms-A Case Study of A Restaurant

張翠庭(Tsui-Ting Chang)

指導教授 ： 劉彩霈 ； 陳彥匡

國立臺中科技大學/資訊與流通學院/流通管理系碩士班/碩士(2022年)

摘要

隨著宅經濟的迅速發展，O2O創新經營型態讓各行各業經營產生了翻天覆地的變化，餐飲業者更是如此。我們發現，餐飲外送服務在各地蓬勃發展，線上餐飲外送平臺儼然成為發展最為迅速的產業之一。外送平臺不僅能提供消費者更多元的服務選擇之外，也能讓餐飲業者透過平臺觸及更多的潛在顧客。外送平臺與餐飲業者建立合理的分潤機制，並向使用者收取相關費用作為平臺利潤來源。
自2020年受COVID-19的影響，消費者已養成在平臺上訂餐外送取代過去店內使用的消費習慣，外送平臺版圖日漸擴大，餐飲業者與外送平臺合作勢必成為趨勢。故本研究旨在利用賽局理論探討餐飲業與平臺之合作策略，也期將此成果提供給相關業者作為經營之參考。
本研究參考Niu et al., (2021) 之基本賽局模型，延伸建立補貼策略與訂閱制之賽局模型，並對個案餐廳進行敏感度分析，探討餐廳與外送平臺合作獲利機制。本研究結果顯示，在補貼策略賽局模型中，線上利潤隨替代率增加而減少，反之，線下利潤則隨替代率增加而增加；在訂閱制賽局模型中，因有收取訂閱費用，且在訂閱同時皆式補貼物流服務費，雙方利潤皆隨替代率增加而穩定成長，同時也驗證了本研究數學模型中替代率越大，則是線下替代線上。因此餐飲業可多向消費者推廣使用外送平臺且鼓勵加入訂閱，以擴大線上的潛在市場，使餐廳與外送平臺合作達到雙贏的局面。

關鍵字

餐飲外送平臺 ； 賽局理論 ； 補貼策略 ； 訂閱制 ； 敏感度分析

並列摘要

With the rapid development of the home economy, O2O innovative management style has brought about earth-shaking changes in the operation of all walks of life, especially in catering operators. We have found that food and beverage delivery services are booming everywhere, and online food delivery platforms have become one of the most rapidly growing industries. The food delivery platform can not only provide consumers with more diversified service choices, but also allow caterers to reach more potential customers through the platform. The food delivery platform establishes a reasonable profit sharing mechanism with the catering operators, and charges relevant fees to the users as the source of profits for the platform.
Since the impact of COVID-19 in 2020, consumers have developed the consumption habit of ordering food delivery on the platform to replace the past in-store use, and the territory of the food delivery platforms are expanding day by day, and the cooperation between catering operators and food delivery platforms is bound to become a trend. Therefore, this study aims to use the game theory to explore the cooperation strategy between the catering industry and the platform, and also aims to provide this result to the relevant operators as a reference for management.
This study refers to the basic game model from Niu et al., (2021), extends the establishment of subsidy strategy and subscription system game model, analyzes the sensitivity of individual restaurants, and explores the profit mechanism of cooperation between restaurants and food delivery platforms. The results of this study show that in the subsidy strategy game model, online profits decrease with the increase of substitution rates, while in turn, offline profits increase with the increase of substitution rates. In the subscription mechanism game model, due to the subscription fee charged, and the logistics service fee is subsidized at the same time as the subscription is subscribed, the profits of both sides grow steadily with the increase of the substitution rates, and it is also verified that the larger the substitution rate in the mathematical model of this study, it is offline alternative online. Therefore, catering industry can promote the use of food delivery platforms to consumers and encourage subscriptions to expand the potential online market and make the cooperation between restaurants and delivery platforms achieve a win-win situation.

並列關鍵字

Food delivery platform ； Game theory ； Subsidy Strategy ； Subscription mechanism ； Sensitivity analysis

參考文獻

英文文獻

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