由於集團企業組織結構複雜及交叉持股的特性,使得集團企業可提供更大的彈性進行盈餘管理。若集團可委任同一事務所查核其旗下子公司的財報時,則較能抑制該集團盈餘管理之行為。本研究以2000年至2011年之台灣集團企業公開發行公司的資料,探討共同會計師與財務報表品質之關聯性。本研究並進一步探討,當公司超額關係人交易程度越高時是否會影響上述之關聯性。實證結果發現,集團企業委任同一家事務所(會計師)查核其旗下子公司之財務報表時,相較於委託不同事務所查核,更能抑制該集團企業盈餘管理之行為。另外,當集團企業發生超額之關係人交易時,委任同一事務所(會計師)查核之集團企業,相較於委託不同事務所查核之集團企業,其盈餘管理之行為顯著較少。再者,當集團間超額關係人交易程度愈高時,委任同一事務所(會計師)查核之集團企業,相較於委託不同事務所查核之集團企業,有更少向上盈餘管理之行為。
Due to their complex organizational structures and cross-shareholdings, the affiliated business groups are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. If firms hire the same CPA firms to audit their affiliated companies, they are less likely to have earnings management activities. Base on a sample of Taiwan listed firms from 2000 through 2011, this study examines whether common auditors is associated with earnings quality. This study further investigates whether abnormal related party transactions affects the relation between common auditor and earnings quality. The empirical results indicate that common auditors are positively associated with earnings quality and that the above relation is more pronounced for firms with the presence of abnormal related party transactions. In addition, further analyses shows that affiliated companies audited by the same CPA firms have significantly less upward earnings management than those audited by different CPA firms.