自2008年次貸危機後,高階經理人薪酬的議題開始受到關注。不同於過往文獻大多以高階經理人薪酬與公司績效做為連結,本研究以股權結構的角度出發,探討臺灣銀行業持股類型差異對高階經理人薪酬之影響。研究中以2005年至2013年的28家商業銀行為樣本,並將股權結構分為三個構面:機構投資人持股、控制性持股及股權偏離程度,並依據最終控制類別分為家族控制、公股主導及專業經理人治理,以釐清持股類型對高階經理人的薪酬水準是否存在異質性。實證結果顯示臺灣之經理人薪酬與績效不相符的情形,而股權結構對薪酬之影響具有差異,機構投資人持股及控制性持股能盡監督之作用,但專業經理人治理及股權偏離程度則反而助長經理人的肥貓現象。
Since the subprime crisis in 2008, the issue of executive compensation has started to receive attention. This study estimates the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance, and the effect of ownership on their relationship among Taiwanese banking industry. We investigate 28 commercial banks from 2005 to 2013, and divide the ownership structure into three aspects: institutional investors, controlling shareholder, and divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. Furthermore, the controlling shareholder is dived into family-owned shareholding, government shareholding, and managerial shareholding. We find that the negative bank executive pay-performance relations. Moreover, banks with institutional investors and controlling shareholder have higher executive compensation and superior performance, while managerial ownership and divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights decrease the pay-for-performance sensitivity.