經理人薪酬與盈餘管理對融資約束之影響

由於受限於融資約束，公司將會面臨營運策略運作因籌資不易而窒礙難行，致使經理人進行盈餘管理手段，以降低融資約束的影響。實務上，經理人薪酬的多寡不僅會影響企業的治理方式及策略，亦會促使其進行盈餘管理，並有可能因此影響融資約束。有鑑於此，本研究企圖以2010~2017年之台灣上市、櫃公司資料作為樣本，探討經理人薪酬與盈餘管理對融資約束之影響。實證結果發現，當前一期經理人薪酬越高且盈餘管理越低時，公司有較低的融資約束。反之，當前一期經理人薪酬越低且盈餘管理越高時，公司有較高的融資約束。此外，本研究亦發現盈餘管理對於經理人薪酬與融資約束之間的關係具有中介效果，即擁高薪的經理人將不願意冒險執行盈餘管理，而領低薪的經理人會受到薪酬誘因的趨使而進行盈餘管理，但此舉反而將加劇公司融資約束程度。

關鍵字

經理人薪酬；盈餘管理；融資約束

並列摘要

Limited by financing constraints, companies will be faced with difficult operation due to difficult financing, and result managers to implement earnings management to reduce the impact of financing constraints. In practice, the amount of managers’ compensation will not only affect the company’s governance methods and strategies, but also promote their earnings management and may affect financing constraints. According to the above, our study attempts to use the data of Taiwan listed and counter companies from 2010 to 2017 as samples, and explore the impact of managers’ compensation and earnings management on the financial constraint. We found that companies have lower financing constraints when the last term managers’ compensation is higher and earnings management is lower. On the contrary, companies have higher financing constraints when the last term managers’ compensation is lower and earnings management is higher. And we has also found that the mediation effect of earnings management. When the salary is higher, the possibility of performing earnings management is lower, and the managers who receive low salary have more positive earnings management motivation due to salary bonus, but the performance after earnings management will intensify the company’s financing constraints.