實質盈餘管理、公司治理、高階經理人報酬

Influences of Real Earnings Management and Corporate Governance on Managers' Compensation

李崑進(Kun-Chin Lee) ； 羅進水(Chin-Shui Lo) ； 李怡慧(Yi-Hui Li)

《全球管理與經濟》 17卷1期 (2021/06) Pp. 17-34

https://doi.org/10.6565/JGME.202106_17(1).0002

摘要

企業高階經理人薪酬大多與財務報表績效連結，經理人有誘因去調整財務報表盈餘以達到績效目標。本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討實質盈餘管理與公司治理對高階經理人薪酬之影響。實證結果顯示企業實質盈餘管理與總經理／副總經理的報償有顯著的正相關，表示實質盈餘管理程度越高，高階經理人報償越高。企業的審計委員會設置與高階經理人的股利報償有顯著負相關。此一實證結果在不同樣本皆有一致結果。

關鍵字

經理人薪酬 ； 實質盈餘管理 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

Top management compensation is linked to firm performance, which is reported in financial statements. Managers thus have the incentives to manipulate earnings to advance their interests. This study examines the impact of real earnings management and corporate governance on top management pay. Its empirical results show a significant positive relationship between real earnings management and the compensation president and vice president receive. Specifically, the higher the degree of real earnings management, the greater the top management compensation. In addition, a significant negative relationship between the corporate audit committees and the dividend compensation of top managers exists. The results remain the same in different sample sizes.

並列關鍵字

Top Management Compensation ； Real Earnings Management ； Corporate Governance