股權結構與經理人獎酬、替換及公司價值之研究

本研究以2005年至2016年之台灣上市公司為樣本，探討股權結構是否會影響經理人的獎酬、經理人的替換以及公司價值。研究結果顯示在最終控制者的股份控制權大於現金流量權時(即股權偏離)，將會影響經理人獎酬及公司價值，當股權偏離程度越大時，經理人獎酬將會越少的趨勢，而公司價值也因股權偏離程度越大而會越低，但對於經理人是否替換並沒有顯著的影響。當偏離程度越大的情況下，經理人的獎酬將越有可能因為最終控制者私利的考量因素而減少越多，此項結果也在對公司價值的分析中得到相符的印證：在公司擁有股權偏離的情況下，將影響公司價值，並且結果顯示當股權偏離程度越大時，公司價值越低，可能為最終控制者的操作下所導致，此研究結果可供投資人及股東藉由股權結構做為是否投資的參考依據。

關鍵字

股權偏離程度；經理人；公司價值

並列摘要

In this study, a sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2016 is used to explore whether the ownership structure would affect the compensation ofgeneral manager, the turnover ofgeneral managerand the value of the company. The results show that deviation from ownership structurewill influence the compensation of general managerand the value of the company. The trend of degree of compensation of general manager and the value of the company will be lower whenthe degree of deviation from ownership structure is greater. However, the turnover of general manager will not be affected by the degree of deviation from ownership structure. When deviationfrom ownership structure is greater, the compensation of general manager willmore likely decline dramatically because of personal interests ineventually controllers. This study also has the same findings about how the compensation of general manager affect the value of the company. The greater the degree of deviation from ownership structure, the lower is the value of the company. The reason may be the ultimate controller of operation. The results of studying aboutshareholders' equity structure provide investment information for investors and stockholders.