自Berle and Means(1932)及Jensen and Meckling(1976)指出所有者與經營者間利益衝突所產生的代理問題,股權結構、公司價值與公司績效間關係,成為學者在理論及實務研究上的焦點;公司治理雖以監督公司管理階層,保障投資人基本權益為重點,惟其最終目的仍在於增加公司價值;然而,該透過哪些機制以緩和管理者與所有權人間代理問題,截至今日亦無定論;為使公司價值極大化,必須選擇最適內部人士及機構法人持股比率、股利決策及負債融資比率以使公司總代理成本降為最低。故本研究期望藉由所有權結構、資本結構與公司績效間關聯性探討,為後續研究提供最佳股權結構、資本結構及財務決策的方向。
Ever since Berle & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggested the correlation among enterprise performance, ownership structure and its agency problem from the conflict of interest between the business owner and the management, this topic has been the center for discussion and study for scholars. Although a good corporate governance lies on the efficient and effective management and safeguarding of investors’ interest, the ultimate objective is to enhance the business value. Nevertheless there has been no exhaustive conclusion in resolving the agency problem and the enhancement of business value requires the right composition of shareholding by the internal investors as well as the institutional investors. Besides this, the right dividend policy and capital structure will also directly contribute to minimize the agency cost involved. This study examine and assess the significance of the relationship among the ownership structure, capital structure and enterprise performance and develop a framework model for future studies and research on this area to facilitate the decision making on the three elements.