- 學位論文
公司治理與資本結構-競爭之干擾效果
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE-THE MODERATING EFFECT OF COMPETITION
摘要
公司治理對資本結構的決定及企業的經營成敗扮演重要的角色，Hicks（1935）指出處於競爭產業內之公司管理者在不斷的壓力下會減少管理懈怠並提高其效率，本文因此探討公司治理對公司資本結構之影響程度是否因產業之競爭程度增加而改變。 本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，以Panel Regression並設定橫斷面固定效果進行實證研究。研究結果發現，董事會規模及經理人固定薪酬對公司槓桿之廻歸係數在不競爭產業與競爭產業中有不同的顯著性，此隱含競爭的環境會使公司治理機制扮演更重要的角色，在不競爭的環境中，由於公司及利害相關人缺乏生存壓力將使公司治理機制弱化。實證結果顯示競爭的環境會使公司內各組織單位皆發揮其應有之功能，不競爭的環境則會弱化公司內各部門的功用，各組織間沒有監督替代的現象。高獲利力公司具有較高的自有資金，因此可減少其向外部舉債之需求，符合融資順位理論；公司規模愈大有愈高的舉債比例，反映大規模公司風險較低，其愈有能力向外舉債，符合抵換理論。
並列摘要
Capital structure means how the composition of equity and debt effects on the corporate operation. Corporate governance plays a very important role in corporate operation from many literatures. The past studies focus on the effect of corporate governance on capital structure. The topic of this study is to explore how industrial competition affects the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure. This study uses the Panel data regression to carry out the empirical test. According to the empirical results, we find that competition has significant effect on capital structure of corporation. In competitive industries, the competition itself is a strong monitoring mechanism, so the board size has no relation with the leverage. Whereas in non-competitive industries, the smaller board size has greater monitoring performance to managers and this makes company debt more. In competitive industries, the CEO fixed compensation is higher, corporate will debt less. On the contrary, in uncompetitive industries, the CEO fixed compensation is higher, corporate debt will debt more. Besides, in non-competitive industries, the CEO ownership is higher, corporate debt will debt less.