法稱之推理理論：演繹或歸納？

Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Anumāna: Deductive or Inductive?

釋有暋(Tsun Nyen Yong)

指導教授 ： 釋見弘

法鼓文理學院/佛教學院/佛教學系/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6819/DILA.2015.00007

摘要

多位現代學者曾以西方傳統邏輯學裡邏輯推理（inference）的分類，即演繹（deduction）或歸納（induction），來分析印度佛教論理學比量（anumāna）理論的特色，尤其法稱（Dharmakīrti, 600-660）之比量理論更成為諸多研究論文之主題。這是由於法稱不但繼承了陳那（Dignāga, 480-540）的論理學體系，更進一步將其改革，導致對7世紀以後印度論理學的發展有巨大影響之故。雖然如此，目前學者們對法稱之比量理論之性質有相當不一致的看法，基本上認為分別屬於演繹法、歸納法或兩者之結合。
沿著學者們的研究成果，本文發現印度傳統論理學最關心的兩個議題是如何建立普遍信念（general belief）以及將其正確地運用到生活中以獲取知識。而以陳那及法稱為代表的佛教論理學在處理這些議題時牽涉到兩個不同步驟：一、從經驗中通過「隨行」（anvaya）與「遠離」（vyatireka）確立某普遍信念；二、將其運用於未經驗過之宗有法（pakṣa）上，並推導出結論。研究發現，不同於西方的形式邏輯（formal logic）僅僅牽涉第二步驟（三支論證法）之態度，法稱之比量理論由於蘊含了第一步驟，因此整體來說表現出歸納的特質。
透過對《正理滴論》（Nyāyabindu）〈為自比量〉品（Svārthānumāna）的翻譯，本文擬定了四個印度論理學的核心議題，分別為：普遍信念之建立、「隨行」與「遠離」之歸納過程、喻例（dṛṣṭānta）之角色以及法稱所提出之「自性相屬關係」（svabhāvapratibandha）理論來做分析。本文試圖深入地探討法稱比量理論的性質屬相，而研究結果顯示，其應被納入歸納法之範疇。

關鍵字

法稱之比量 ； 歸納法 ； 演繹法 ； 為自比量 ； 自性相屬關係

並列摘要

As a famous Indian Buddhist logician during the 7th Century, Dharmakīrti (600-660) inherited and reformed the logical system developed by his predecessor Dignāga (480-540). His contribution has great influence on the development of Indian Logic, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Due to its importance in Indian Logic, modern scholars have tried using the traditional classification method found in Western Logic, namely the deductive and inductive methods, in analyzing Dharmakīrti’s inference theory (anumāna), which exhibits many distinctive figures among Indian logical systems. Based on different angle of observations, however, sholars have come out with dissimilar conclusions regarding the charactetistic of his theory. As a result, those who think that it is inductive dispute the conclusions made by those who think that it is deductive, while others believe that it is a mixual of both methods.
Therefore, it is the intension of this thesis to re-examine Dharmakīrti’s anumāna theory using the two terms invented by the Western logicians. First of all, it is recognized that the conundrum faced by Indian logicians are simply the process of generating general belief and its correct application in common process. Under this circumstance, the Buddhist logicians developed a logical system that involves two distinct steps. Firstly, through the scrutiny of the method of association (anvaya) and disassociation (vyatireka) between major term (sādhya) and middle term (hetu), the observer concludes with a general belief regarding the relation between the two terms (vyāpti) from his own experiences. Secondly, the observer then applies this general belief onto the minor term (pakṣa) to generate a conclusion. Research shows that while Western Formal Logic only concerns with the second step, it is the first step that becomes primary focus in Dharmakīrti’s inference system, hence indicates its inherence inductive nature.
This thesis develops four core issues of discussion concerning some important characteristics found in Indian Logic, namely the process of generating major premise, the method of association and disassociation between two terms, the role of examples (dṛṣṭānta) in inference, and finally the theory of natural relations (svabhāvapratibandha) developed by Dharmakīrti. Besides, the chapter of “Svārthānumāna” in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu is translated and studied in order to better understand the characteristics of his theory of anumāna. As a result, this thesis concludes that Dharmakīrti’s theory of anumāna reveals strong inductive nature.

並列關鍵字

Dharmakī ； rti’s anumā ； na theory ； induction ； deduction ； svā ； rthā ； numā ； na ； svabhā ； vapratibandha

參考文獻

巫白慧（1995）。〈梵本《因明入正理論》—因三相的梵語原文和玄奘的漢譯〉。《中華佛學學報第八期》。頁41-57。台北：中華佛學研究所。

Bowles, G. 1994. “The Deductive / Inductive Distinction.” Informal Logic 16.3, pp. 159-184.

Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 2010. Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyāya Viewpoint. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1922. A History of Indian philosophy. London: Cambridge University Press.

Dreyfus, Georges B. J. 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany: State University of New York Press.