In recent years Australia has placed increasing emphasis on the expansion of security cooperation with the states of East Asia. In Northeast Asia these cooperative relationships are less developed than in Southeast Asia, but from the perspective of Australian policy makers they are of growing value and importance. Although geographically distant from Australia’s area of immediate strategic interests serve to shape the security environment of whole East Asia region and as the location of many of Australia’s most important regional bilateral relationships. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea, Australia’s bilat eral relations with the Republic of China ( Taiwan ) are underdeveloped , consisting largely of a significant economic re - lationship . The growing array of security contacts between Australia and each of the other countries of Northeast Asia has not been extended to Taiwan and in the short term this will not change . Nevertheless , as Canberra ' 5 support for United States policy at the time of the March 1966 straits crisis demonstrated , Canberra has more than a passing interest in the Taiwan ' 5 future . Australia ' s overriding concern 15 to see the peaceful evolution of relations be - tween Taiwan and China and the resolution of differences between Beijing and TaiPei in a way that accommodates the interests of governments on both sides of the straits . While this links Australia ' 5 interests to Taiwan ' 5 future , the direction of Canberra ' 5 policy towards Taipei continues to be shaped by a series of countervailing considerations , not least Australia ' 5 desire to preserve the integrity of its relations with China . For all this however , it seems certain that for the foreseeable future Australia ' 5 formal security relations with Taiwan will re - main constrained by the reality of Australia ' 5 one China policy . This will limit the prospects for official bilateral dialogue on re - gional security issues . Nevertheless , several avenues to expanded consultation remain open . First , the two governments should take opportunities for of - ficial discussions ( including at ministerial level ) during regional multilateral meetings and forums . Taiwan ' 5 limited membership of these forums places restrictions on this opportunities , but within APEC (of which Taiwan is a member and where bilateral discussions are an established part of the annual summit process) a regular process of dialogue is well within reach. Second, it would be useful to regularise meetings along the lines of the first Taiwanese-Australian regional security dialogue held in Canberra in 1992. Although this meeting was convened by academics from the Australian National University officials from several Australian government agencies sat in on the talks which also included participation from sections of the Taiwan military. Third, Australian members of the Conference on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) should continue to ensure that Taiwan remains part of the CSCAP process and that its academics participate as fully as possible in its councils and working groups. Fourth, academic and research institutions in both Australia and Taiwan should be encouraged to develop closer research contacts with regard to security issues. Particular effort might be directed to establishing joint research projects which will draw faculty members into regular contact through workshops and conferences. Fifth, and finally, both sides might seek to expand parliamentary contacts. The ‘unofficial’ visit to Taiwan in May 1994 by an Australian parliamentary delegation comprising members of the Joint Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade offers a model for this initiative. These are modest initiatives, but it is unrealistic to expect the Australian government to move either strongly or directly towards a more comprehensive security relationship with Taiwan. Given its strategic position, its military capability, the importance of the bilateral economic relationship with Australia and the generally favourable position Taiwan occupies in the Australian consciousness, there is much to be said in favour of establishing close security relations. At the very least, the kind of regular security dialogue that Australia enjoys with many other states of the region would seem likely to prove of value to both sides. In the short term however, Australia’s one China policy makes even this an unrealistic goal.