我國公司法第210條第2項雖規定股東得檢具利害關係證明文件,指定範圍,隨時請求查閱或抄錄同條第1項之章程及簿冊,但因其得閱覽或抄錄之範圍並未包括會計帳簿及相關資料,故徒具帳簿閱覽權之形式,而無帳簿閱覽權之實質。又隨著企業集團化之發展,日本「會社法」及美國德拉瓦州「一般公司法」分別規定控制公司股東於符合一定條件下,得請求閱覽或抄錄從屬公司之會計帳簿及紀錄,引進帳簿閱覽權之跨越行使法制,以強化控制公司股東對從屬公司之監督。本文除介紹帳簿閱覽權之基本概念外,並將採用比較法研究,論述德拉瓦州「一般公司法」及日本「會社法」有關帳簿閱覽權之發展歷程,並分析其法律適用上之解釋問題。其次,並檢討2003年德拉瓦州「一般公司法」及日本2005年「會社法」修正前後之標竿案例及其隱藏問題。再者,並分析股東跨越行使帳簿閱覽權之正當性及可行性,並提出幾種建立理論基礎之思考路徑。最後,則指出我國現行帳簿閱覽權法制之立法缺失,進而提出革新之道。
According to Paragraph 2, Article 210 of Taiwan Company Law, any shareholder of a company may request at anytime, by submitting evidentiary document(s) to show his/her interests involved and indicating the scope of interested matters, an access to inspect and to make copies of the Articles of Incorporation and accounting books and records mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, the scope that the shareholder could inspect and copy does not include the original data of the accounting books and records. Therefore, shareholders' inspection rights only exist in formality other than substance. With the development of the corporate groups, the Company Law of Japan and the General Corporation Law of Delaware in USA introduce the pass-through execution of shareholders' inspection rights respectively to improve the supervision powers of shareholders of controlling company to its subsidiary. Both Japan and Delaware have the statues expressly grant that the shareholders of controlling company have the rights to inspect or make extracts from a subsidiary's accounting books and records under the compliance with the statutory requirements.First, this paper will introduce the basic concept and the developing backgrounds of inspection rights in the Company Law of Japan and the General Corporation Law of Delaware in USA. Then it will further analyze the interpretations and applications of the related regulations based on the comparative study. The next part will investigate the landmark cases and the implied problems before and after the amendments to the 2003 General Corporation Law of Delaware in USA and the Company Law of Japan. In addition, it will discuss the legitimacy and feasibility of the pass-through execution of shareholders' inspection rights and provide several approaches to construct their theoretical basis. Finally, it will indicate the legislative shortages of the current shareholders' inspection rights in Taiwan and provide the revolutionizing approach.