從法律經濟分析觀點論商標侵權反向混淆之正當性爭議：以博弈理論為中心

The Economic Analysis of the Reverse Confusion Debate in Trademark Infringement: Based on the Game Theory

張郁齡(Yu-Lin Chang)

《臺大法學論叢》 43卷1期 (2014/03) Pp. 65-141

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2014.43.01.02

摘要

不同於傳統正向混淆中小企業攀附大企業商譽的商標仿冒侵權行為，2012年著名的蘋果電腦公司在中國大陸的iPad商標糾紛，則是大企業利用小企業之註冊商標以促銷自己產品的反向混淆類型。透過案例法的肯認，反向混淆亦屬商標侵權類型之認知已獲共識。惟作為商業活動的手段，商標使用的主要目的在追求利益的最大化，無法或無意願將商標價值最大化的商標權人，在註冊主義的保護下，雖然維護了對其財產的自主權，卻衍生有限的社會資源無法做有效率分配的質疑，反向混淆保護的正當性面臨經濟效益觀點的挑戰。挑戰反向混淆理論「讓強勢侵權者繼續使用系爭商標，將對弱勢商標權人權益造成莫大損害」之傳統認知，本文嘗試透過博奕理論的若干理念及法律評價的典範轉移現象，推導出在反向混淆案件，讓弱勢商標權人個人財富最大化的作法，正是容忍強勢侵權者繼續使用系爭商標，並進一步提出、評析落實此政策的相關建議，最後再檢討我商標法制應如何因應。

關鍵字

反向混淆 ； 法律經濟分析 ； 智豬博奕 ； 策略行動 ； 典範轉移 ； 損害賠償計算 ； 合理權利金

並列摘要

Recognized as a specialized form of trademark protection, reverse confusion prevents the larger junior user from taking the smaller senior user’s trademark as his own. However, it was also criticized that it protects the smaller senior user at the price of the waste of social resources because only the junior user of reverse confusion cases is capable of promoting trademark values through sheer economic strength. Hence, some scholars, from the perspective of economical efficiency, suggest that where the benefits exceed the harms, the best solution is to allow the junior user's infringement despite the harm to the senior user.Challenging the traditional view of ”the allowance of the junior user's infringement is at the expense of the senior user”, this article, based on some concepts of game theory and paradigm shifts in law, tries to prove that the optimal solution for the senior user to maximize his benefit is to allow the junior user's use of the mark, and further provide some suggestions on the purpose of making this policy come true.

並列關鍵字

reverse confusion ； the economic analysis of law ； boxed pigs ； strategic moves ； paradigm shift ； damages calculation ； reasonable royalty

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