On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Anti-Terrorist Military Operations

Chiu-Lung Huang

《Prospect Journal》 5期 (2008/10) Pp. 123-166

https://doi.org/10.6443/PJ.200810.0123

並列摘要

An anti-terrorist military operation is by nature a military operation other than war, reflecting a number of non-traditional security considerations and interests. Participants in an anti-terrorist military operation have developed a relationship of cooperation with potential conflicts that is sometimes regarded as an uncertain strategic and limited adversary relationship in game theory. These participants are thus like game players. Whether one player's commitment to cooperation against potential conflicts is strong enough to have a convincible effect on other players or not will depend on his social practices. Therefore, a weaker player caught between big ones would adopt a balanced policy. Big powers, which might change their cooperative positions because of their domestic situations, would try best to avoid conflict among them. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), members have had different strengths, but have developed an asymmetric cooperation and engagement model: put territorial sovereignty and traditional security issues tinder the anti-terrorist military and non-traditional security cooperation to construct a multilateral security regime. This article aims at analyzing whether the players' commitment to cooperation is strong enough to have a convincing effect. Analyzing this effect can explain the conditions and limitations of this organization in its future development and provide a better understanding of the security situation in Central Asia.

並列關鍵字

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ； anti-terrorism ； commitment strategy ； military operations other than war ； new security concept