國軍在長春圍困戰中的空中支援問題

遼瀋戰役為國共三大戰役中的第一場決戰，在該戰役前夕，國軍已遭壓縮於長春、瀋陽與錦州三處據點。在共軍決定先襲取國軍位處東北最南端的錦州，即執行「關門打狗」前，共軍曾試圖攻略國軍位處最北之長春。到了遼瀋戰役展開時大批共軍仍被牽制於長春，而國軍在應對共軍的攻勢時也一再考量此處，故長春圍困戰在整個戰役中實具有關鍵地位。歸咎根本，蔣中正對東北部隊的調度舉棋不定，不僅造成了長春圍困，更造成了東北全局的進退失據。蔣在1948年初即指示將瀋陽之部隊南撤，重點鞏固錦州，這樣空運能量還可專注於對長春守軍的運補，不致分散。以事後的角度來看，蔣的構想較為穩妥，但蔣未將其念強行貫徹，最終錯失了機會，此是為戰略上的失調。然而，失調的戰略又影響了戰術的應用，戰術問題在長春出現的情況為無視空軍運補能量不足卻期望部隊固守待援，及未能在適當之處發揮空軍的優勢。第六十軍軍長曾澤生作出決定的因素有很多，受到共軍漸佔上風的戰力、政治攻勢及國軍內部的歧視，而最重要因素為糧食補給不足。1948年10月初，戍守長春的第六十軍選擇投共，這個選擇影響了其他部隊，包括中央系新七軍的鬥志。因此，共軍未經大戰即佔領此處，且得以迅速轉移兵力，加劇對瀋陽守軍的威脅。1947年末，長春路上交通遭共軍截斷，後勤補充仰賴空運但未包含大量糧食。在共軍持續壓縮包圍下，守軍由城郊愈來愈難取得糧食，因此，由空中大量接濟軍糧開始於1948年5月底。在市郊主要機場失落後，空軍只能由空運轉為空投補給，這使得本已不足的糧食更加稀釋。蔣曾數次命令空軍增加空投噸位，這顯現了其對空軍能力有一定理解，不過縱觀守軍的防禦攻勢，蔣並未強調使用空軍密接火力支援。空軍有更佳的射擊視野，又能夠及時配合陸軍的標定來精準攻擊，這些本是國軍的火力優勢。筆者試想若國軍高層及早強調陸、空配合並堅守住或奪回大房身機場、寬城子機場以提升運補效率，或能為戰局開創更多有利的機會。

關鍵字

後勤；空軍；遼瀋戰役

並列摘要

The Liaoshen Campaign was the first of the three major campaigns during the second part of the Chinese Civil War. The Siege of Changchun played a vital role in the Liaoshen Campaign for various reasons. Prior to this campaign, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) had been compressed in three different strongholds, Changchun, Mukden, and Jinzhou. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had tried to occupy Changchun, the NRA's the northernmost stronghold in Manchuria. Afterwards, the PLA decided to attack Jinzhou, the southernmost stronghold in Manchuria, using the strategy known as ＂block the enemy's retreat and then destroy them.＂ There were two major things to consider when the Liaoshen campaign been launched. On the one hand, the NRA needed to consider the change of circumstance of Changchun while much PLA had been contained in this city. On the other hand, the NRA needed to figure out how to support their force which held there. The ultimate cause of the siege of Changchun and the total collapse of the NRA in Manchuria is that Chiang Kai-shek did not have definite strategy for Manchuria. In the early 1948, Chiang had ordered the troop in Mukden to retreat to Jinzhou and to consolidated there. This deployment enabled the NRA's air transport to concentrate on the work in Changchun. In hindsight, Chiang's conception was viable, but he did not fully carry it out. Owing to a lack of coordination in strategies and in turn a lack of specific tactics, the NRA missed their opportunity in the end. The commanders ignored the fact that the air force was not deployed optimally and that the air transportation could not meet the ground troops' demand for supplies in Changchun. Moreover, they expected the ground forces to hold until reinforcements arrived. In early October of 1948, the 60th Army, which encamped in Changchun, chose to surrender to the PLA. There were several reasons for Zeng Zesheng (曾澤生), the commander of The 60th Army, to make such a decision, including the PLA's growing military power, the intensification of the PLA's political offensive, the NRA's internal discrimination, and most crucially, the issue of food supply. The surrender influenced the morale of other troops in Changchun, including the New 7th Army, which was one of central command troops. Moreover, because of the surrender, the PLA captured this stronghold without using much force. Additionally, the PLA could quickly transport forces to Mukden, thereby creating more threat to the NRA's troop there. From late 1947, because the transportation to Changchun had been cut off by the PLA, the NRA had depended on air force for armaments supply, but not much for food supply. Constantly compressed by the PLA, the NRA could not collect more food from the suburbs. As a result, since the end of May, 1948, the NRA solely depended on air force for food supply. After losing the main airports in the suburbs, the NRA could only supply the ground troop by airdrops. However, airdrops could only partially meet the demands due to the limited amount of food. Chiang had ordered the air force several times to increase the tonnage of airdrop, showing that Chiang knew what air force was capable of. Nevertheless, he did not emphasize that the air force should provide close support. He did not fully utilize the NRA's military advantages, that is, the air force had better vision of shooting and could coordinate the ground force to attack at a specific target marked by the army. In this essay, I argue that the NRA would have had more opportunities if the superiors of the NRA had emphasized as soon as possible the coordination of air force and the ground troop, strengthened the defense, or even ordered the recapture of Dafangshen (大房身) and Kuanchengzi (寬城子) airports for promoting the efficiency of air supply.